Is Mevlana Jalal al-Din Rumi a Religious Pluralist?
Ali Akbar Rashad
Abstract
The present article is an attempt to study religious pluralism in the viewpoint of Mevlana. There are some researchers who even consider him as a founder of religious pluralism. The main hypothesis of the present research is that Mevlana was not a religious pluralist. Moreover, a number of questions which are related to this issue are discussed; The secret of religious pluralism or diversity fo religions; Are all religions right? Or some of them are wrong and some are right. Are all of them amalgamations of right and wrong? Are all of them wrong and there is no right religion?
There are four theories about these question, which will be discussed in this paper as well.
Keywords: Mevlana, John Hick, religious pluralism, right, wrong, exclusivism, inclusivism, naturalism.
Introduction
Some scholars such as John Hick think of Mevlana as a religious pluralist and even consider him as the founder of religious pluralism. We think that this view concerning Mevlana is seriously false. In this short paper, we try to unveil falsity of this view.
Before beginning our discussion, we define religious pluralism which is one of the theories concerning the problem of “other religions”. Then we will begin our main discussion.
Concerning questions such as 1- “what is the reason behind diversity of religions?”
; 2- “are all the existing religions true, or some of them true and the others false?”
; 3- “are all of them a combination of falsity and truth?”; and 4- “are all of them false with no true religion?”, four theories have been presented:
1- Naturalism: this theory says that the religion cannot not be true, then nor is there a true religion;
2- Religious exclusivism says that there is only one true religion, and other religions are false;
3- Inclusivism says that a particular religion is true; and even if other religions contain some true ideas, the true religion contains all true ideas.
4- Religious pluralism. Let us explain religious pluralism in more details, since it is the subject matter of the present article.
Meaning and Kinds of Religious Pluralism
Religious pluralism may have various principles and consequently various meanings and instances. For example, religious pluralism may be based on the assumption of the plurality of religion in factual world, i.e. it may be based on the assumption that the essence of religion is, as a matter of fact, plural; also religious pluralism may be stemmed from belief in inevitability of the diversity of understandings and acquisition of various kinds of knowledge of religion. Also, it may mean acceptance of possibility of similar functions for religions or various spiritual traditions. The first kind may be called “ontological religious pluralism”, the second kind “epistemological religious pluralism”, and the third kind “functionalist religious pluralism”.
In ontological pluralism in which plurality refers to the external existence of the subject, three states may be imagined:
1- Factual plurality of the essence of the religion which means acceptance of existence of some religions in parallel; 2- multidimensionality of the essence of religions which means that though the essences of religions are the same, the religion has different factual manifestations; 3- gradation of the fact and essence of the religion. In the first state, three possibilities may be imagined: the first is that all the existent religions are true; the second is that some of them are true and some others are false. The third is that none of the religions are absolutely true or false, but combinations of truth and falsity. The same three possibilities may be thought of concerning two other assumptions, i.e. different aspects of the religion and factual religion.
Epistemological religious pluralism is realized influenced by different factors. The series of factors may be classified under “triple foundations involving in development of knowledge”. Triple foundations are as follows: 1- knowing subject, 2- known thing, and influencing external factors which I call them “aids of knowing”. By “aids of knowing”, I mean factors out of the essences of two main foundations of the development of knowledge (i.e. knowing subject and known thing) which play their role as aids of, or obstacles to, the process of development of knowledge. (This division is based on a particular epistemological theory I believe in it) .
Since religions and quasi-religions have various worldly and other-worldly functions in the fields of knowledge, life, guidance, and salvation, to find their similarities and dissimilarities, different and identical functions, these systems are compared with each other. Thus, functionalist pluralism may be deemed as one of the images and interpretations in the field of religious pluralism. In this case, based on the kind of the function taken as a basis for pluralism, various kinds of functionalist religious pluralism may be imagined.
The set of expected and existent possibilities and ideas concerning religious pluralism may be depicted as follows:
Religious Pluralism
In addition to the above division which is based on the “kind of fundamental hypothesis” for acceptance or realization of plurality, typology of religious pluralism may be based on other criteria as well; for example according to narrowness or extent of the field of pluralism, religious pluralism may be classified in three ways:
1- Maximalist way in which no religious knowledge or tradition will be out of the coverage of pluralism;
2- Intermediate way according to which only revelatory religions such as Abrahamic ones or only great traditions or Eastern traditions or Western traditions fall within the field of pluralism, or only legitimacy or right to life of those religions is recognized which have been victorious in debates made with their rivals (in other words, pluralism is accepted only for those schools whose demonstrative fight has shown sufficiency of their arguments; their claims have become antinomic) or pluralism is accepted only in the field of religious traditions or religious knowledge and not in the field of factual (revealed) religions.
3- Minimalist pluralism according to which pluralism is accepted and applied only in a very narrow field; for example, plurality is recognized only for various schools of the same religion such as Shi‘ism and Sunnism within Islam and Catholicism, Orthodoxy, and Protestantism within Christianity. Minimalist pluralism, then, may be called “pluralistic inclusivism” or “family pluralism”.
Now, Mevlana and Pluralism
In order to ascribe an idea to a certain person or to deduce a particular claim from a certain text, many authenticate scientific evidence and rules should be taken into consideration and appealed to. Not all ideas may be ascribed to all persons, and not all texts may be interpreted in whatever way.
To explain, it should be said that to ascribe an idea to a theologian, his ideological, intellectual characteristics, and temporal, cultural, social conditions of his environment, limits and kind of his knowledge and the like should be taken into account; and according to suitability (or unsuitability) of that idea for those conditions, that idea may be ascribed to (or, negated of) him.
To interpret a text as well, it should be understood and interpreted according to a series of rules and evidence. For example, principles such as the following five ones are necessary: 1- Principle of “knowledge of the nature of the text”; for example, whether it is a religious or a scientific one; 2- the principle of “the text being a whole” (each text is consistent and has a focal claim; and claims introduced in it are, in principle, related and even coherent). 3- the principle of “similarity between the text and author”; for example a work of a monotheist mystic is not the same as that of an atheist; 4- the principle of “appropriateness of the text with climatic, historical, epistemic, and scientific containers; emergence of the text should be understand by taking into account historical and scientific conditions of its development; 5- literal and rhetoric rules.
An atheist saying, therefore, cannot be ascribed to a faithful monotheist one. Also, a modern scientific claim cannot be ascribed to the one who had lived in the Stone Age. Also, a sacred Divine text cannot be interpreted in an atheistic way; or conflicting claim cannot be- without sufficient evidence- ascribed to the same book; or meaningless points cannot be- without sufficient evidence- extracted from a writing ascribed to a rational and mindful man. (though he may commit errors, but this is an exception; and exception cannot be regarded as rule, nor can it violate the rule).
In ascribing pluralism to Mevlana, one should notice that he was a faithful and monotheist Muslim, a wise and clever man, a rationalist and realist philosopher who lived in the Middle (pre-Kantian) Ages in the Islamic East. And one with such characteristics cannot be a pluralist concerning his religious ideas; for, because of his being a Muslim, he insisted seriously in the exclusive or inclusive truth of the religion of Islam.
He believes that Islam is a global and eternal religion having maximalist truth; and all names and fames other than the name of Islam will be vanishing. If there are some truths in other religions, all truth are contained in the religion of Islam. And relation between Islam and other religions is like the relation between the number 100 and tens under it all of which are contained in the number 100. Having Islam we have all truths.
“The names of kings are removed from the dirhems, (but) the name of Ahmad (Mohammed) is stamped on them for ever
“The name of Ahmad is the name of all the prophets: when the hundred comes (is counted), ninety is with us as well .
He blames Christians who think that Jesus Christ has been crucified and at the same time regards him as God; he says that those who have crucified him (Jews) may not be saved by taking refuge to him!
“See the ignorance of the Christian appealing for protection to the Lord who was suspended (on the Cross)
“Since, according to his (the Christian’s belief), he was crucified by the Jews, how then can He protect him?
According to him, man is free and his freedom has led to his greatness; and based on his own knowledge and free will, he chooses either disbelief or belief; either guidance or deviation:
“Because We have honoured Man by (the gift of) free-will: half (of him) is honey-bee, half is snake;
“The true believers are store of honey, like the bee; the infidels, in sooth, are a store of poison, like the snake;
“Because the true believer ate choice herbs, so that, like a bee, his spittle became (a means of giving) life;
“(While), again, the infidel drank sherbet of filthy water: accordingly from his nourishment poison appeared in him.
He is a realist (and not a skeptic or relativist) philosopher; thus, he thinks that acquisition of knowledge is possible, and there is a methodology for this; he regards true knowledge a knowledge corresponding to the reality; after narrating the famous parable of the “elephant and blind men”, he says that if they did not content themselves to senses and if they consult their reasons, they would be able to understand the reality.
“If there had been a candle in each one’s hand, the difference would have gone out of their words .
In another place, he regards the reason as a touchstone to evaluate sense perceptions:
“Get (learn) the distinction between evil and good from reason, not from the eye that tells (only) of black and white;
“The eye is beguiled by the verdure on dunghills, (but) the reason says, “Put it to my touchstone” .
Based on a naïve realism, he thinks that rational understanding of the external world is possible
“An intellect giving light like the sun is needed to wield the sword that never misses the right direction .
For him, reason is light, and to gather rational experiences will lead to twofold unveiling of truth:
“(If) the intellect is paired with another intellect, light increases and the way becomes plain .
He thinks that sense perceiving eye is unable to understand the truth and acquire knowledge; and regards particularist empiricism as an enemy of the religion and reason:
“Throw dust on your sense perceiving eye: the sensuous eye is the enemy of intellect and religion .
He thinks that reason and religion are of the same kind and two wings of life and salvation; he recommends his addressee to take only reason and religion as her/his guides:
“Do not mount the restive horse without a bridle: male Reason and Religion your leader, and farewell .
But as is well-known, the theory of religious pluralism has nothing to do with the Mevlana’s era, but it is a theory of the 20th Century and it has been emerged in the modern era. Its social and cultural backgrounds and epistemological, philosophical and religion-philosophical principles are entirely modern. Relation and contacts between religions which may lead to unpleasant social consequences may be entirely found in the contemporary era . The discipline of philosophy of religion, among whose issues is pluralism, is less than 200 years old . The main philosophical and epistemological justification of this theory has been taken from Immanuel Kant’s epistemology.
In addition to all above points, it should be noted that religious pluralism is based on the “essential plurality of religions”; Mevlana, however, insists upon “gradational unity of religions”
Also, evidence provided from Mevlana’s works and poems to confirm religious pluralism does not prove this claim; on the contrary some evidence suggests against the claims of claimants; and even in his works, there are many points in criticizing pluralism.
From among pieces evidence appealed to for ascribing pluralism to Mevlana according to which they have tried to ascribe some sort of critical realism to him and then to call him “pluralist” is some parables and allegories he has made uses of them in Mathnawi to explain philosophical, epistemic, mystical and moral concepts . Here, I will explore and evaluate some cases: 1- the parable of the elephant and blind men; 2- the parable of the same light and various lamps or shining of the sun on various places.
Before going to analyze, it should be noted that allegories and parables may only be suitable to facilitate understanding of claims; but they never prove the claims; for parable is generalization of a particular judgment to another particular judgment, without there being a certain common point between similar parts or a known reason behind the judgment; in allegory as well, similarity may be in an aspect, but there may be difference and even opposition in other aspects; that is why they have said that allegory is in one aspect intimating but in many aspects it increases distance. In the fourth book of the Mathnawi, Mevlana emphasizes this point .
But how about the parable of elephant and the blind men to which in epistemological issues is appealed to prove impossibility or relativity of knowledge?
Firstly, one may mention another parable suggesting that truth is accessible, though (and even) by chance or through an ignorant and imitative motion. In the second book of his Mathnawi, Mevlana speaks of a man who has lost his camel and is searching for his lost camel, desert by desert, town by town; and another man, without losing his camel, is imitatively, or to ridicule him, accompanying him claiming that he has lost his camel as well! Whatever the former says or asks, and whenever he runs, the imitating lying man says or asks, and runs.
When the truthful man, after knowingly attempts, finds his lost camel, he sees that there are two camels; and suddenly the imitating ignorant man notices that one of them is his own camel, but he has not known that his camel had been lost; and truly he has not been searching for the camel and he has found there his camel accidentally! From this story Mevlana concludes that
“When a liar set out (to journey) with a truthful man, his falsehood turns to truth of a sudden
“That imitator became a true searcher when he saw his camel browsing there .
Secondly, the parable (of elephant and blind men) is to reject authenticity of senses to acquire knowledge, and to criticize sense-sufficiency or to emphasize the necessity of appropriateness between tools of knowledge and subject of knowledge; and notes that true knowledge of the members of elephant is possible through the vision and not by hand and touching faculty.
Thirdly, if the object of knowledge is the elephant and not its members (which is typically what is considered), the parable is to show defects and inefficiency of one-dimensional and particularist views in acquisition of knowledge, i.e. a defect of which suffer most human hypotheses and theories –in particular in our time-; knowledge of the elephant, which is a whole, is possible through a universal-seeing eye (an eye which sees beyond and comprehensively). In other words, the whole truth is grasped through a universal-seeing philosophical look and not through empiric attempts which are praticularist and one-dimensional. That is why to conclude from this parable, Mevlana says:
“On account of the (diverse) place (object) of view, their statements differed: one man entitled it “d’al,” another “alif”
“If there had been a candle in each one’s hand, the difference would have gone out of their words
“The eye of sense-perception is only like the palm of the hand: the palm hath not power to reach the whole of him (the elephant) .
According to the other interpretation, mistake committed by, and difference between, blind men were caused by superficialism, obstinacy, and selfishness of blind men and their negligence of esoteric points and guidance made by the spiritual guide.
“If a master of the esoteric had been there, a revered and many language man, he would pacified them.
Fourthly, if the object of knowledge is elephant, the parable will not prove that each and every knowing subject has acquired a portion of reality (even though negligible) and knows one of the dimensions of the elephant. For, in this parable none of the touching men has understood a part or dimension of the truth; and even they have gone further from the truth and all of them have equally committed mistakes; and their states are much worse than those who have not yet touched the elephant. For the latter ones have no imagination of the elephant; but those who have touched the elephant have misunderstood him; and simple ignorance is less worse than the complicated ignorance. For the simple ignorance may be likened to the ground zero, while complicate ignorance is like a position under the ground zero!
Fifthly, even if we accept that blind men’s knowledge shares a portion of truth, that truth is not a truth concerning the elephant; but rather the truth acquired by each one of them is a knowledge concerning the member touched by him. In this case, each one of them has come relatively close to the truth concerning his own object of knowledge; for he has, at least, understood corporality, sensibility, its form and volume, hardness … of the body touched by him.
(Anyway, as seen, a parable may be interpreted in various ways and suggest different and even conflicting claims; in any case, this parable does not suggest critical realism, we do not mention religious pluralism).
Other Parables
The other parables appealed to for ascribing religious pluralism to Mevlana are as follows: “The single light of the sun being a hundred in relation to the house-courts (on which it shines)” , which suggests that a single light source creates hundred lights; but if we remove walls, it will become clear that there is only one light (Book 4). We may mention the parable according to which “if there are ten lamps in the same place, apparently there are ten lamps and the light of each one of them is other than those of the others; but, since light is light, all of them are the same thing; and when we take into account instead of lamps, light, we cannot distinguish them from each other .
Also, like the light of moon which rises in the dark night and shines through windows on houses, though each one of the lights shined through each window is apparently an independent light, whenever one of them disappears, the others disappear as well. And this shows that there is but one light .
Concerning these parables can, and should, be said that:
First of all, presupposition of religious pluralism, as its name shows, is plurality of religions (and not their unity). Mevlana is a religious man who believes in the unity of religions and in these parables he has emphasized the unity of religions- true religions and truth of religions. In the beginning of this part of Mathnawi, Mevlana appeals to the holy verse “The believers are naught else than brothers” (the Holy Quran, 49: 10) and the hadith “true scholars are like one soul”, and inspired by the holy verse “We make no distinction between any of them [prophets]” (3: 84), he emphasizes that denial of one of the prophets is the same as denial of all of them, and mentions that truth and people of truth are but one.
Secondly, Mevlana believes in the true unity of prophets and revealed and genuine religions (before being altered); and there is no one of the people and followers of the revealed religions who denies this point. He believes that plurality and diversity of interpretations and alterations are caused by the role played by human beings’ understanding in the field of realized religions and religious knowledge. That is why he says:
“On that account these companions of ours are all at war, (but) no one (ever) heard of war amongst the prophets
“Because of the light of the prophets was the Sun, (while) the light of senses is lamp and candle and smoke (ibid, 4: 450-1)
This means that the light of the prophets is like the light shone by the Sun, and there is no difference between them. Then, there is no plurality so that pluralism may be necessitated). Human epistemic tools, however, are smoking and dark sources of light.
Thirdly, these parables are aimed to make a distinction between Lord lights (revealed religions) and sense and none-Divine lights (i.e. thoughts whose source is not Divine revelation); and this has been expressively mentioned by Mevlana. He considers the Divine lights as one light, and non-Divine lights as plural lights. Also, he calls non-Divine lights unstable, and incapable of showing the truth . In other words, religious pluralism is founded on a view which assumes plurality of religions. Even if such plurality may be imagined, it is in the non-revealed schools (schools which are not connected to the source of revelation). Such schools are not representing the truth.
Finally, I emphasize that by appealing to such parables, Mevlana can never be called relativist, pluralist, and religious pluralist. Within the frame of Islam, however, Mevlana has supra-sectional ideas, and we think that he cannot be confined within the frame of one of the schools stemmed from Islam.
Sources:
1- The Holy Quran
2- Este‘lami, Mohammad, Ta‘liqat, Mathnawi (Book Three)
3- Rashad, Ali Akbar, Qabasat (no. 37), Dialogue with John Hick
4- Rashad, Ali Akbar, Principles of, and Obstacles to, New Understanding of Religion and Religious Theorization
5- The Mathnawi of Jalal ud-din Rumi, translated and edited by Reynold Alleyne Nicholson
6- Hick John, Problems in Religious Pluralism