A Critique on John Hick’s Religious Pluralism

A Critique on John Hick’s Religious Pluralism

Professor Ali Akbar Rashād

Contents

Prelude 3
Chapter One Ambiguity of Key Concepts and Claims 7
Chapter Two: Critique of the Methodology of the Theory 20
One) Introduction of Great, but Non-Argued, Claims 22
Two) Sarcasm instead of Scientific and Demonstrative Encounter 27
Critique of the Idea of “Ineffability of the Reality”
and “Negative Theology” 28
Three) Employing Similes and Allegories instead
of Giving Arguments 40
Four) Providing Non-Philosophical Arguments
and Evidence for Philosophical Claims 45
Five) To Provide Cause instead of Giving Argument 47
Six) To Present a Caused Claim as an Argued One 48
Seven) Other Problems with the Theory
in Methodology and Argumentation 49
Chapter Three: Critique of Epistemological Foundation
of the Theory 50
The First Part) Similarities and Dissimilarities
between You and Kant 51
Part Two) A Brief Critique of Kant 56
Third Part) Critique of the Epistemological
Foundation of the Theory 59
Bibliography 70

Prelude

Dear Mr. John Hick!
With the sincerest greetings and best wishes
In 1997, Mr. Abdolkarim Soroush published an article in Iran (Kian, no. 36, “Straight Paths”) in which inspired by your ideas and referring to them , religious pluralism was defended. Just after it, I wrote an article to criticize his article (Qabasat, vol. 2, no. 2, 1997 (Summer), “Taking the Water of Life to Darkness”). Since then I was waiting to meet you and speak with you concerning your theory. Fortunately, we met each other in Birmingham University on December 12th 2002. (I sent you a summary of that scientific meeting; but since I received no reply, I published it as it was. Now, I will add it at the end of this writing as the attachment 1).
Before that time, I has a different idea of you; in that meeting, however, I found you a gentle, patient, polite, gracious, adhered to his own religious beliefs, fair, and open-minded man. I felt that, because of benevolent motivations and by a firm decision and faith, you were trying to introduce, explain, justify, and propagate a view which you thought of it as a solution for bitter historical debates and wars stemmed from plurality of religions and inconsistencies between them; and you have insisted upon this way for more than half a century. After that meeting, I have repeatedly admired these characteristics in scientific circles. This motivated me to invite you once again to pay a visit to the Institute of Islamic Culture and Thought in Tehran on February 21st 2005.
Discussions in the second meeting as well as our sincere discussion during the symposium dated February 22nd in my office reconfirmed your good characteristics.
In reply to critiques I posed against your theory during the conference held in the Institute, you said that you were not sufficiently ready to provide replies. You recommended me to send you my critiques so that you might have enough time to provide replies for them.
Now, and after the letter dated August 15th 2005 and messages to follow-up the issue sent by you, I have to apologize you, since my various concerns and program did not allow me to respond to your request before this time. Now, I present some points to discuss your theory in brief; and I am waiting enthusiastically to receive your replies. I hope that you, unlike me, will not delay in your response. Of course, for the time being, I have put in writing three (of ten) chapters (conceptological critique, methodological critique, and epistemological critique) which I send you. The other chapters will be put in writing and sent gradually.
Dear Mr. John Hick!
You know that your reading of religious pluralism is not only a theory concerning “other religions”- which is in its right one of the issues of philosophy of religion- but, because of your restless attempts, it has become an extensive theory, and even a special philosophical discourse (our paradigm) to think “about religion” and “in religion”; and based on it, you have founded a special approach in theology and an independent school in philosophy of religion.
Thus, if your reading of pluralism is accepted, man’s definition for, and understanding of, all religious issues will change. Within the context of religious pluralism, as viewed by you, nature of religion, essence of religion, religious knowledge, belief and disbelief, worship and religious practices, goal and function of religion, scope of religion, prophethood, origin of religion, language of religion, God, His attributes, guidance, salvation, resurrection, …, all and all, should be interpreted differently. You have been well-aware of these point; and in a recent interview you have said: “Pluralistic view should help us to understand intra-religious claims differently, and re-understand them” (Madrasah, no. 2, 2005 (Autumn), p. 51). You have added: “I think that if pluralism is accepted, classical theological teachings should be re-understood” (ibid., p. 52). But, and nevertheless, in the present essay, I have decided to discuss your religious pluralism only as a theory (and not a school in philosophy of religion or a paradigm in religiology).
A complete and efficient theory should enjoy important characteristic, including: 1) conceptual transparency, 2) a concrete main subject, 3) coherent parts and elements, 4) a suitable and consistent methodology, 5) clear and firm presuppositions and principles, 6) firm and resistant arguments and pieces of evidence, 7) ability to criticize and falsify opposing theories, 8) sufficient generalizability, 9) useful theoretical and functional results.
Now, we should find to how extent your theory of religious pluralism enjoys the above-mentioned characteristics. Your theory, I think, may be criticized in the following aspects:
1- Transparency of concepts and claims the theory
2- Methodology (methodological critique of the theory)
3- Epistemological principles and arguments (epistemological critique of the theory)
4- Philosophical and rational principles and arguments (rational critique of the theory)
5- Principles and arguments taken from philosophy of religion (critique of the theory based on philosophy of religion)
6- Critique of theological principles and argument (intra-religious critique of the theory)
7- Ability to falsify the opposing theories
8- Generalizability of the theory to all religions, religious traditions, and kinds of religious knowledge
9- Evaluation of the success of theory in theoretical realm (explanation of the issue of other religions)
10- Evaluation of the success of theory in practice (whether it has succeeded to solve the problem of religious debates and remove the obstacles to peaceful co-existence between followers of various religions).
Now, I will go to discuss your theory of religious pluralism based on the above ten themes.

Chapter One
Ambiguity of Key Concepts and Claims

The first point in a theory which draws attentions is key concepts and claims used in that theory. In your works, many key terms such as “religious pluralism”, “transformation”, “salvation”, “Ultimate Reality”, “religion”, “religious tradition”, “religious experience” and the like have been used; in using such terms; however, many incoherencies or at least brevity and ambiguity are seen to some of which we allude here.
You know that religious pluralism may have various foundations and, consequently, various meanings and references. To explain, it should be noted that religious pluralism may be based on the assumption of unavoidable plurality of the truth of religion in the noumenal world; in other words, it may be based on the belief that, as a matter of fact, the essence of religion is plural, and this is an unavoidable truth; also, religious pluralism may originate from belief in the necessity of diversity of understandings and acquisition of plural kinds of knowledge of religion. Also, it may be the same as accepting possibility of various and equal functions for plural and different religions or spiritual traditions. These three kinds of religious pluralism may be called, respectively, “ontological religious pluralism”, “epistemological religious pluralism”, and “functionalist religious pluralism”. In what follows, I provide some explanations concerning each of these assumptions.
One) In the ontological religious pluralism, in which reference of plurality is the external existence of the object of plurality, three situations may be found: 1) plurality of religion in the noumenal world, according to which there are some parallel religions without a particular link between them; 2) multifacetedness of the unique religious truth; i.e. though the truth of religion is but one, religion possesses various and parallel noumenal manifestations; 3) multifacetedness and multilayeredness of the noumenal world and the truth of religion, in other words, manifestations of the single noumenal religion are in vertical (and not horizontal or parallel) relation to each other).
In the first case, three states may be assumed:
One- all existing religions are true;
Two- all of them are false or some of them are true and some others are false; and
Three- none of them is completely true or completely false, but rather they are syntheses of truth and falsehood.
These three states may be assumed concerning the second and third cases (i.e. various facets and layers of the noumenal religion) as well.
Two) As epistemological pluralism emerges under the influence of various factors, all these factors may be classified under “three foundations involving in generation of knowledge”. Three foundations of formation of knowledge are the knower (subject), the known (object of knowledge), external and peripheral elements of knowledge which I call “aides of knowing”. By aides of knowing, I mean factors which lay out of the essences of two other foundations of generation of knowledge (i.e. the knower and the known). Aides of knowing, of course, are divided into three groups: some of them concern the knower, some others concern the known, and the third ones are those which concern none of them. Sometimes aides of knowing play a negative role and some other times they have a positive function; thus, they are classified under two categories: “obstacles” and “aides” (a brief explanation will be provided in the attachment 2 of this essay).
Three) Religions and quasi-religions have various functions in theory, practice, guidance, and salvation; thus, such systems may compared with each other in terms of what they have in common, their difference, or equality; then, functionalist pluralism may be regarded as one of the interpretations in the field of religious pluralism. In this case, depending on the kind of function which has been taken as a basis for pluralism, various kinds of functionalist religious pluralism may be assumed.
All ideas and possibilities concerning religious pluralism can be displayed as follows:

In addition to the above division (which is based on the “kind of foundational assumption” for accepting plurality or its occurrence), religious pluralism may be classified based on other standards; for example on the basis of the extent of the scope of pluralism, it may be divided into three groups:
1- Maximalist: in this version, of which you have spoken in some of your works and put emphasis upon it, no religion or religious knowledge or religious tradition lies out of the scope of pluralism; for example you have implicitly regarded irreligious wisdom of Confucius and even atheist ideology of Marxism as being covered by pluralism. Even sometimes, based on the inclusive view of Cantwell Smith, you have claimed that new religious movements and great secular faiths such as Marxism, Maoism, and Humanism may be covered by pluralism (Problems of Religious Pluralism, p. 42)!
2- Moderationist: as you said in your interview in Birmingham on 12 December 2002, only revelatory religions like Abrahamic faiths or only some traditions like great ones (to which you allude usually in your works (Problems of Religious Pluralism, pp. 68-9; Religious Pluralism, p. 607) or Eastern and Western traditions are covered by pluralism. Or, only truth or the life of right of religions or quasi-religions which have won debates with some of their rivals is recognized; in other words, pluralism is accepted only concerning schools demonstrative debates between them and their rivals has led to sufficiency of arguments; or pluralism is accepted only in the layer of religious “traditions” or religious “knowledge”, and not concerning noumenal religions (religions revealed in themselves).
3- Minimalist: pluralism is accepted in a very limited scope; for example plurality of the sects of a single religion such as Shiism and Sunnism in Islam and Catholicism, Orthodoxy, and Protestantism within Christianity.
Religious pluralism may be divided into pluralism of “truth” and pluralism of “salvation” or “positive” and “negative”, or “cause-centered” and “argument-centered” or vertical and “in time” (belief in legitimacy of every religion in its own historical context) and horizontal and “simultaneous” (belief in truth of all religions existing in parallel in the course of history).
Such separation and divisions are not a mere assumption; most or all of them have their advocates, or- though not so accurately- they have discussed and confirmed in ideas of the authors of pluralistic views.
The most important term in your theory is “religious pluralism”. Taking into account the above divisions, now I ask you: “Do you mean by this term an ontological pluralism i.e. acceptance of plurality of religions in the noumenal world, the essence of religion, and “Ultimate Reality”? Or do you mean acceptance of epistemological diversity of religion, i.e. diversity and plurality of knowledge concerning religion and the ultimate truth? Or by religious pluralism do you mean acceptance of the plurality of popular spiritual traditions created in the context of cultures and religions? Or do you mean functionalist pluralism; in other words, do you think that there are many ways to guidance and salvation (and even references of salvation)? Or do you want to recommend another version, i.e. religious, moral, and social acceptance of others and toleration of opponent to those who believe in religions? Firstly, you write that “… and metaphysical impersonae, as I shall call them, are not illusory but are empirically, that is experimentally, real as authentic manifestations of the Real” (Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, p242); and “I suggest that in fact the truth-claim and the salvation-claim cohere closely together and should be treated as a single package” (Problems of Religious Pluralism, p. 46); according to you, religion is real and the importance of religious beliefs to the believer lies ultimately in the assumption that they are substantially true references to the nature of reality. You say: “and the importance of religious practices to the practitioner lies in the assumption that through them one is renewing or deepening one’s relationship to the transcendent divine Reality” (Ibid., p. 16). Since some ideas in some religions cannot be brought in agreement with some other ideas in some other religions, religious pluralism is the same as [acceptance of] plurality of the truth of religion.
Secondly, you have regarded Kant’s epistemological views as the source and basis of your own theory (Fifth Dimension, pp. 62-3; Philosophy of Religion p. 245; and An Interpretation of Religion, p. 42). You say: “… divine Reality which is in itself limitless, … is humanly thought and experienced in various conditioned and limited ways” (Problems of Religion Pluralism, p. 104); and think of this diversity as a product of the role played by the mind and the basic concepts which form knowledge. You think: “… the great world faiths embody different perceptions and conceptions of, and correspondingly different responses to, the Real or the Ultimate from within the major variant cultural ways of being human” (Problems of Religious Pluralism, p. 47). You have emphasized that “Persons living within other traditions, then, are equally justified…” (An Interpretation of Religion…, p. 235). Such sayings mean plurality of knowledge of religion, and not noumenal plurality of religion.
Thirdly, you accept that the noumenal religion is other than religious tradition and regard cultures as the main players of the scene of birth and death of religious traditions; and religions and religious traditions as products of cultures; nowhere you find a pure religion, and regard whatever there is as religious traditions; and ascribe diversity, neither to the truth of religion(s) nor to knowledge obtained from them, but rather to movements and traditions emerged within cultures (Problems of Religious Pluralism, Fifth Dimension).
Fourthly, you emphasize functionalist pluralism and say: “Pluralism, then, is the view that the transformation of human existence from self-centredness to Reality-centredness is taking place in different ways within the contexts of all the great religious traditions. There is not merely one but a plurality of ways of salvation or liberation. In Christian theological terms, there is a plurality of divine revelations. making possible a plurality of forms of saving human response” (Problems of Religious Pluralism, p. 32). And this means that yours is a functionalist pluralism.
Fifthly, having described discriminations against Asian and African immigrates after the age of British Colonialism, you have proposed religious pluralism as a solution to remove debates, reject discriminations, and oppose to oppressions (Problems of Religious Pluralism, Three Controversies, p. 8). This means that your theory is a moral solution for problems originated from diversity of religions and nations and debates between them.
Because of ambiguity of the key term of theory (religious pluralism) ambiguity has been admitted in the nature and goal of the theory as well. In other words, the ambiguity in the main claim of the theory shows itself in its goal or function as well. Thus, it is not clear that what your main problem is; and by propagating religious pluralism you want to solve which problem. Do you try to prove “being guided of followers of all faiths” or solve the problem of their “salvation”? (Problems of Religious Pluralism). Or, are you trying to solve the problem of discriminations made by God? Or, do you intend to “provide an acceptable explanation for plurality of religions and their relations to each other”? (Madreseh, no. 2, p. 60) Or, are you seeking for a way “to propagate moral tolerance” concerning religious and social debates? Which one the four is the main problem? It is as if you have been suffered by the fallacy of “collection of problems in a single problem”. And you know that some of them cannot be brought in agreement with others; for example, either religion is in the station of subsistence and noumenal world but one, but in the station of proof and knowledge it is plural (epistemological religious pluralism) or it is plural in the station of subsistence and noumenal world (ontological pluralism).
You should clarify that whether religious pluralism is a philosopher theory or an epistemological one, or a historical and culturological view, or it is a theological idea, or a moral recommendation for social interest. various kinds are different in terms of their foundations and methodologies:
If it is a philosophical theory- which is apparently so-, then it should be proved and analyzed by rational and non-religious arguments in which case there is no need to appeal to all these non-philosophical evidence; also, if it is a theological view- since a religious view is a special one and not all religions and believers accept it-, then you have to appeal to intra-religious arguments specified to a special religion; and that you insist that all people should accept it is not correct; for this is a non-pluralistic and exclusivist conduct!!
There is no need to all these philosophical and epistemological arguments and conflicting pieces of evidence for moral recommendation and social interest (in this essay, I will show that, to prove your claim, you have appealed to different and incoherent arguments!).
One of the other widely used key terms in your theory is the term “transformation” or “salvation”. You have regarded a religion’s capability to create “transformation” as a criterion for “a religion to be a religion” or a school to be regarded as a “religious tradition”; and religions’ power to cause transformation as a standard for them to be covered by “religious pluralism” (Problems of Religious Pluralism, p. 84). But what is this transformation; and what does salvation mean? You have never provided a clear explanation for it. It is not clear that which of the followings you mean by “transformation”:
1- Is it power to ignore material things and worldly joys for which you have regarded (in Fifth Dimension, part V, Chapter 20) Mahatma Gandhi as one of its most striking examples?
2- Is it attainment of the station of self-denial (Problems of Religious Pluralism, p. 84)?
3- Or, is it attainment to the station of annihilation or something similar to it (Problems of Religious Pluralism, p. 84), which you have confirmed Rahner’s ideas (Problems of Religious Pluralism, p. 56)?
4- Is it transformation to a limited “image” of God (Fifth Dimension, p. 155)?
5- Is it belief “in the essential unity of man” (Fifth Dimension, p. 200)?
6- Is it acquisition of power to intervene in the world of generation (which is called in Islam “generative authority”)?
7- Is it, as you have emphasized the power of Marxism to create such states in its own followers , self-sacrifice and readiness for abnegation (Hick, Philosophy of Religion, p 3)?
8- What is the worldly function of religion as a worldly ideology as in some of the above assumptions?
9- What is its other-worldly function? (sometimes you have regarded “transformation” as an other-worldly function, and “religiosity” of traditions and “truths” of claims as dependent of other-worldly eschatology! While confirming Peter Pyrne’s understanding of eschatological salvation in your Problems of Religious Pluralism, you have emphasized pluralistic view as a basis, and said: “it is not a morally or religiously acceptable view that salvation depends upon being a member of the Christian minority within the human race” (Problems of Religious Pluralism, p. 102). In the eighth and ninth chapters of problems of Religious Pluralism you have interpreted and defended it (eschatological salvation) very well (Ibid, pp. 11-118).
You should clarify that which of the followings you mean by transformation and salvation (which you regard it as the main criterion for religions to be covered by pluralism). And as you know, some of them cannot be brought into agreement with others.
Nevertheless, in your articles and books, you have repeatedly defined that this transformation as the transformation of human existence from self-centredness to Reality-centredness (Problems of Religious Pluralism, p. 31). This is a special interpretation of salvation provided by you, and in addition it is very absurd and brief; and does not remove ambiguity of this key term! Of course, religions themselves are not in agreement concerning the meaning and reference of salvation; each of them presents a particular meaning for it; and each Saint has acquired one or more of the above states and meanings.
On the other hand, you have admitted: “There is of course no reliable census of saints! Nor indeed is the concept of a saint by any means clear and unproblematic; very different profiles of saintliness have operated at different times and in different places” (Problems of Religious Pluralism, p. 36).
Nor is it clear that what you mean by “Ultimate Reality” and its equivalents- which is one of your key terms. Is the object of that appeal and encounter with which causes man’s transformation a real thing (which you have sometimes emphasized (An Interpretation of Religion, p246, Problems of Religious Pluralism, p. 87)? And if the Ultimate Reality is a real thing, how may inconsistent interpretations of it (such as objectivism and other than it apply to it equally and correctly? Or, is the Ultimate Reality a non-real thing (which you have sometimes confessed) (exclusivism versus Pluralism in religion: a response to cevin meecer, religious studies, no 42. page 210)? How can a non-real thing exercise some influence, and that a so important and great thing, i.e. salvation- which is according to you the end of all religions (John Hick, (2006). (Exclusivism versus pluralism in religion: a response to Kevin Meeker, Religious studies, 42. p 210)? And if the object of encounter is a real thing, should that real thing be necessarily the Origin of being and life from whom all beings have been issued and it is the creator every things and every ones, dominates and surrounds everyone? Or, it is not necessary for the object of encounter to be the origin and creator of all things and surrounds everyone? If this is the case, will you accept that such a being may be the origin of such transformation? And is not such a being dominated by another creator, owner, and lord who is the real God of the world?
And what is that reality for which you cannot even select a name(!), but use various names for it (Absolute, i.e. Real in Problems of Religious Pluralism, p. 49; Ultimate Reality, ibid., p. 39; God; Fifth Dimension, p. 14; also An Interpretation of Religion, p. 236, p. 297). As you see it cannot possess all references and attributes claimed by various religious traditions; since, as you confess, claims are very conflicting, incoherent, and different (Problems of Religious Pluralism, p. 167). May the problem of ambiguity or “exclusivism” solved through avoidance of applying the term God for that ambiguous Ultimate Reality, or applying the term “The Real or the Absolute” to it? (Problems of Religious Pluralism, p. 172). And if various religious traditions have provided erroneously dogmatic and fanatic definitions for divinity and none of them is in a cosmic vantage-point to view the truth as it is (Problems of Religious Pluralism, pp. 97-8), then how can such erroneous or incomplete traditions and definitions lead to man’s salvation/liberation?
From among non-revelatory traditions, the greatest one is the Buddhist one; and, Gautama Buddha, according to some of his followers, will return to this material and lower world (perhaps to find some time to attain Nirvana as some Buddhist sects think), how can one believe that Buddhism and other quasi-religions will grant salvation? And how can this school be regarded as falling in the scope of pluralism of salvation?!
And even if Gautama (and hundreds like him) has (have) attained, through Buddhism, Nirvana and liberation, is this sufficient to accept efficiency and sufficiency of this school for mankind’s salvation? How about billions who, in spite of their attempts to attain salvation through Buddhism, have not succeeded?! Does such a fruitless or lately-found way deserve to be traversed?
What do you mean by religion and religious tradition? Is religion a cognitive and practical (theoretical and practical) system sent down through revelation by the Origin of being and life for mankind’s perfection and happiness in this world and the world to come? (I define religion as such, and revelatory religions are such systems). Or any school popular among men and women (even non-Divine ones such as Confucianism) may be called religion or religious tradition? (Problems of Religious Pluralism, p. 43) Or any idea and school of thought existing in the world, even though a human one (An Interpretation of Religion…, p. 253) or a secularist one (Problems of Religious Pluralism, p. 43-4) or atheistic and anti-religious (Ibid., p. 44), may be called “religion”?
And what is the standard for truth a revelatory system or sprititual school or human school, or to classify religions and quasi-religions?
Rationality and testability by man’s reason? (Problems of Religious Pluralism, p. 79) Or, enjoyment of a lofty morality or enthusiastic vision-granting or conquest of hearts (Ibid., p. 70-9)? Or a power to change mankind from self-centeredness to God/Reality-centeredness (which you have noted repeatedly)? Or other-worldly and eschalatogical testability? (Ibid, p. 80) Or, all religions should be confirmed since not all of them may be tested and classified?! And all of them should be regarded on a par (Ibid., p. 86)? And it seems that you do not consider a standard to apply the term “religion” and “religious tradition”, and consequently a concrete standard to specify the scope of religious pluralism! So that you welcome Ludwig Wittgenstein’s definition for religions based on “family resemblance” and according to it, you regard atheist and religion-fighting Marxism as being among religions (Hick, Philosophy of Religion, p 3).
The above ambiguities are a part of coneptologic ambiguities in your theory which have found their way to the essence of your theory and made it profoundly ambiguous; and you should solve this problem. Concerning such points about the theory, we suffice to this, and proceed to discuss the second category i.e. methodological problems of your theory.

Chapter Two:
Critique of the Methodology of the Theory

You have said: “…the pluralist hypothesis, which is not itself a religious doctrine but a philosophical theory” (Fifth Dimension, p. 96). Thus, your views concerning theory are expected to be based on a philosophical methodology and supported by firm and certain philosophical arguments. Surprisingly enough, a review of your books and articles does not fulfill such an expectation. To explain and prove your claim and to criticize rival views, you have not always and everywhere adhered to philosophical methodology; but rather, most times, you have employed non-philosophical and non-demonstrative methods. In what follows, we will give some examples.
One) sometimes, based on no argument, you have posed great claims; and replaced “certainty” by “conjecture” and probability; you have replaced “certain claim” by “doubted probable”! Some other times, instead of arguing for your claim, you have sufficed to exclude its opposite!
Two) Sometimes, instead of providing scholarly replies for or accepting objections posed against your theory, you have taunted the opponent, and in this way avoided scholarly encounter!
Three) Many times, instead of arguing, you have appealed to similes and allegories!
Four) And, sometimes, to introduce a philosophical claim, for which ontological, epistemological, and rational explanations and justifications should be provided, you have appealed to intra-religious arguments and sociological and historical evidence; and in this way, you have committed then error of confusing the epistemic scopes and methodologies of various sciences (such as philosophical and epistemological inference from theological, mystical, moral, … principles).
Five) And sometimes, to make others accept your philosophical theory, you have referred to social interests or moral recommendations.
Six) In some cases you have pretended a justified claim as an argued one, and tried to argue for your pre-decided claim and show it as a true one.
Seven) If sometimes you have gone to give some arguments, your arguments have suffered one of the followings:
7-1. Or you have regarded as an argument what that is not argument, and attributed consequences and conclusions of a true argument to it!
7-2. Or your argument has nothing to do with your claim!
7-3. Or your argument is more particular than the claim!
7-4. Or your argument is more universal than the claim!
7-5. Or to prove a claim, you have appealed to incoherent and conflicting arguments!
Eight) In addition to the above objections, various fallacies have found their way in explanations and presentations of your claims. For example:
8-1- Fallacy of petitio pricipii
8-2- Fallacy of “non causa procausa”
8-3- Fallacy of particular generalization
8-4- Fallacy of employment of common words and confusion of terms
8-5- Fallacy of many questions
8-6- Fallacy of confusing the station of subsistence with the station of affirmation
8-7- Fallacy of confusing reference with the sense
8-8- Fallacy of confusing possibility with reality
8-9- Fallacy of confusing realization with legitimacy
8-10- Fallacy of confusing truths with mentally-posited concepts
8-11- Fallacy of confusing first order and second-order knowledge
8-12- False and unsuitable attributions to Islam, Islamic mysticism, and to persons such as Rumi and other Muslim mystics, and then founding some claims on such incorrect attributions.
To avoid verbiage, here I suffice to give only one or two examples for each of the above eight objections, and leave the detailed study of fallacies for some other time.
Now, Some Detailed Examples of Objections
One) Introduction of Great, but Non-Argued, Claims
If we put together the claims posed with no argument by you concerning this theory, we will find a long list of non-argued claims; I will study only two examples of such non-argued claims, and then call your scientific conscience to decide about them:
First Example) Taking as true all conflicting ideas concerning the Real- the Exalted- and the Absolute Reality; for example you confirm simultaneously regarding Him as pure good and mere evil; and even rejecting Him with proving His existence; monotheism and Oneness of the Real with polytheism!!
Though this is the central claim of your theory, without any argument, you say: “This varied family of distinctions suggests the perhaps daring thought that the Real an sich is one but is nevertheless capable of being humanly experienced in a variety of ways. This thought lies at the heart of the pluralistic hypothesis which I am suggesting” (Hick, Problems of Religious Pluralism, p 40 & p 47). And even you think that “a spiritual formation within a non-theistic tradition” is possible (ibid., 24)!
I remember justifications made by you in your books and articles to explain this view; most of them, however, cannot be regarded as arguments for your claim; and even if they are arguments, they are not philosophical in nature. And your plea that the Reality is transcategorical and “We cannot say, for example, that it is personal or that it is impersonal; or again, that it is good or that it is evil, that it is a substance or a process, even that it is one or many” (Fifth Dimension, pp. 8-9), I will discuss elsewhere in this writing.
Dear Mr. John Hick!
Can a varied family of distinctions suggest [as you put it] this daring thought? Can one claim the Reality is transcategorical to attribute everything to Him, and to speak of Him however he wishes even in an irrational manner?
Second Example) Concerning the process of production various ideas and images from the Ultimate Reality, you say: “The two basic concepts which are central to the different forms of religious experience are the concept of deity, or of the Real as personal, and the concept of the absolute, or of the Real as non-personal. These take particular concrete forms at different human interfaces with the divine, as the divine personae (Yahweh, Shiva, Vishnu, the heavenly Father. the Qur’anic Revealer, and so on) and the divine impersonae (such as Brahman, the Tao, nirvana, sunyata, the dharmakaya)” (Problems of Religious Pluralism, p. 90).
You have noted the same point in Religious Pluralism (pp. 80-1). Is not this only a claim or conjecture with no argument, which has been introduced, through imitation of the Kantian epistemological model, to explain and justify claims.

Professor!
1- How have you found and why do you claim that sacred knowledge is produced under influence of such a mechanism and process?
2- You think that the Ultimate Reality cannot be understood and explained on the basis of basic concepts; what are these “basic concepts”? And, are not these concepts human ones?
3- Are these concepts and categories a priory (existing before penetration into our mind and before being subjects of our knowledge of the world of nature, or “Divine truth))? Or, are they a postriori?
4- Concepts and categories are of the kind of knowledge, and inevitably they should be produced by particular mechanisms and processes. What is the process producing them? And how is the process of production of those categories? Are they similar to the mechanisms and processes producing religious knowledge? Or, are they different?
5- If you say: “such concepts and categories are produced under the influence and within the context of particular concepts and categories and a particular process, my question will remain open forever. For this question may be repeated infinitely! And if, in reply, you say: “Production of basic concepts and categories producing sacred knowledge are excepted from this rule, I will ask: “why should such categories and concepts be exceptions?”, and if exceptions to this rule are possible, “why should not sacred knowledge itself be an exception to the rule?”
6- If we assume that your claim (concerning mechanisms and processes of production of religious knowledge) is true, another serious question will arise: “Why are, within the context of a single process and under the influence of a single family of concepts and categories, various and conflicting epistemic systems and discourses shaped?” Why is the Ultimate and Divine Reality formed in minds of some people as personae thing and in minds of the others as impersonae? And why are various and conflicting ideas created under each of the above two readings? What is the reason behind such a duality? You say that this originates from different cultures (Fifth Dimension, p. 49). And this is only a non-argued probability faced by many challenges, for example:
First) Cultures themselves are not as diverse and numerous as religions and religious sects.
Second) In a global scale, there are many points shared by cultures; and if cultures cause kinds of knowledge to be produced, then religious traditions of the world- which are their effects- should have many things in common; but, there is no similarity between some kinds of knowledge and religious traditions on the one hand and some others on the other.
Third) If we accept that religious knowledge is shaped under the influence of particular concepts and categories originated from cultures, then why are there within the context of a culture- for example eastern culture- two or more completely distinct and even conflicting religious experience in parallel? Why does different and conflicting experiences of the Ultimate and Divine Reality appear within the context of the culture of the East or an Eastern region such as sub-continent, among members of a nation, a clan, and even a family?
Now in India, kinds of schools from theism to paganism, from kinds of polytheism to agnosticism and pure atheism, from Hinduism with its various and diverse branches to Buddhism to its numerous and conflicting branches, from Islam to Christianity to Judaism, from the most ancient religious and quasi-religious traditions to the newest schools and quasi-religion, all and all, have been created within the context of a single culture, among members of a single nation, and within a land, and have survived with no sign of weakness. And what has occurred in the ancient culture of that land which we see that a each and every moment new quasi-religion appears there?
In the memory of history many periods have been recorded in which within the context of a culture or among members of a nation a great turn has occurred, and a comprehensive polytheist religious tradition has been replaced by a pure monotheistic faith! What occurred in the culture of the Arab society in the Age of Ignorance (7th Century)- in spite of presence and domination of Christianity, Judaism, and polytheism- that people welcomed Islamic monotheism? What were the basic concepts and categories occurred in the minds of the people of that land, and under influence of which culture and why were such concepts formed?
What occurred in the recent centuries in the Western culture that western people proceeded to secularism? What were concepts and categories producing this new vision? What changes have occurred in the global culture that mankind refuses modern materialism and accepts spirituality so enthusiastically? And now, what concepts and categories make this new global vision?
Why is Buddhism (which was born in the context of the Eastern traditional culture) spreading in the western modern and postmodern cultural context? And why are now westerners converting to Islam? Has a particular development occurred in the Western culture before such conversions? For what reason(s), do you think that culture is the most important factor of formation of religious traditions (Fifth Dimension, p. 65)?
There are dozens cognitive and non-cognitive factors- other than culture- each of which may be regarded, instead of culture or together with culture, as a cause for production and development of traditions and sacred and non-sacred knowledge. Why do not you make a mention to them? Man’s innate nature and reason, divine inspirations, teachings of prophets, structure of man’s mind and language, genius of special people, bodily situation and psychological states, moral and personal characteristics of individuals, climatic circumstances, inheritance, education, friendship, communications, propaganda, progress of science, development of methodology and intellectual skills, increase of individuals’ knowledge, technology and mechanisms of discovery, characteristics of the object of knowledge, and dozens known and unknown factors, individually or collectively, may contribute in production of special basic concepts and formation of religious traditions and epistemic discourses.
Why do you think man is a prisoner of culture? And in essence, why determinism? You believe that God did not introduce Himself clearly so that man would not be forced to only believe (Hick, Problems of Religious Pluralism, p 25) and “To make space for human freedom, God must be deus absconditus, a hidden God” (Fifth Dimension, p. 43). Why do you neglect the role played by prophets and reformers in intellectual and cultural developments? And why do you neglect the certain historical fact that prophets and reformers have been always architectures of great historical turns and great intellectual revolutions? And why do not you (as a philosopher) respect man’s will and power of selection; and why do you (as a faithful Christian) neglect the role played by God’s providence? Why do you say: “religion is a product of culture”, while the history attests that it is religions and quasi-religions which have created civilizations, cultures, artworks, morality, values…?
Two) Sarcasm instead of Scientific and Demonstrative Encounter
Please read your expression carefully:
“It would indeed not make sense to say of X that none of our concepts apply to it. (Keith Yandell (1975, 172) calls this no–concepts interpretation ‘strong ineffability’.) For it is obviously impossible to refer to something that does not even have the property of “being able to be referred to’. Further, the property of ‘being in a condition that our concepts do not apply to it’ cannot, without self-contradiction, include itself. But these are logical pedantries which need not have worried those classical thinkers who have affirmed the ultimate ineffability of the divine nature. ” (Hick, An Interpretation of …, p 239).
Now, I ask you: “Is the above objection which as you have said Mr. Plantiga has posed against the theory of ineffability (Warranted Christian Belief, pp 45-63) really justified or no? As a philosopher, you cannot say that it is not justified; you will certainly admit that the theory of ineffability is subject to more profound and serious objections than the one just mentioned. Why instead of providing reply to a rational objection or accepting it, do you appeal sarcasms and avoid scientific encounter? Ineffability, and as you say transcategorality of the Ultimate Reality is one of the main foundations to justify your theory. And since your theory is a philosophical claim, and debate between you and opponents is a scientific and philosophical one, you have to prove it based on arguments and provide demonstrative replies for critiques; at the same time, the philosophical opponent cannot be opposed like a political opponent by sarcasms!
A great part of your arguments for the theory of religious pluralism is based on the theory of ineffability, and critique of it may be regarded as another reference of your un-argued great claims. When it is shown that this is a shaky idea, it will be revealed that the critique of ineffability is not “pedantry”, but rather a truth which have been ignored. This can be regarded as a proper example of some other methodological errors in your theory. Here we discuss this idea in brief :
Critique of the Idea of “Ineffability of the Reality” and “Negative Theology”
Many theories have been introduced concerning possibility and permission of Divine effability, way to describe Him, and conceptology of attributes. Taking into account diversity of theories as well as importance of the point, philosophers and theologians are divided into three groups based on their positions: one) anthropomorphists, deanthropomorphists, and those who suspend the issue.
Anthropomorphists are, in turn, divided into 1/1) absolute anthropomorphists, and 1/2) relative anthropomorphists. Deanthropomorphists are divided into two groups as well: 2/1) those who believe in absolute deanthropomorphism; for example, Plotinus who says:
“The Supreme, as the Absolute Good and not merely a good being or thing, can contain nothing, since there is nothing that could be its good … The only way is to make every denial and no assertion, to feign no quality or content there , “.
2/2) Those who believe in relative deanthropomorphism are divided into three groups:
Absolutists also may be divided into three groups: 1) those who think that God cannot be described; 2) those who think that Divine attributes cannot be understood; and 3) those who are of the opinion that [God’s] attributes cannot be expressed.
3/1) Relativists are divided into two groups: those believing in negative theology such as Maimonides (A Guide for the Perplexed, Chapter 4)
3/2) Those who believe in affirmative theology. Under affirmative theology, various theories are introduced, for example:
1) Doctrine of similarity based on the proportionness of the creator and the created or similarity between cause and effect. Thomas Aquinas had been of this opinion (Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Part I, 13, A.5).
2) Doctrine of polysemy and gradation of the being of attributes; this doctrine is that of the Iranian philosopher, Mulla Sadra (16th Century AD/11th Century AH). About this doctrine I will provide sufficient explanations at the end of this section.
3) Harmony and functional similarity between attributes of the creator and the created (Alston, Being, Itself and talk about God p. 21)
The above doctrines may be explained as follows:

There are, of course, other doctrines such as that of logical positivists concerning semantics of names and attributes as well as religious propositions which cannot be classified under the above categories. They think that theological propositions are, in fact, meaningless quasi-propositions communicating no meaning.
It should be noted that some philosophers and theologians have presented their own ideas about description and conceptlogy of attributes in an ambiguous manner. For this reason, some of them can hardly be classified under one of the above categories.
To clarify that how the doctrine of “ineffability”- which you have advocated and on which based your religious pluralism- is baseless and meaningless, here I note some points about it:
One) It is not clear which attitudes and ideas you advocate; I mean that your expressions are conflicting; for, sometimes you do not so oppose anthropomorphism; but rather you speak about the Truth- the Exalted- in a positive way, and describe Him by the following phrases and concepts:
You think that His Essence is One (Problems of Religious Pluralism, p 40), He is the Real (ibid., p. 41) and a truth in His essence which is certain; you call Him the Real (ibid., p. 98) and the Ultimate Reality (ibid., p. 106), you think of Him as being testable and possessing various manifestations or as you put it reflections (Hick, The Fifth Dimension, p 91).
Some other times, you insist upon negative theology; and in some still other times, you go to suspension, and say that the Real is ineffable, and prohibits any description of Him. You say: “…we cannot properly either affirm or deny that it has any of the positive qualities captured in human language” (Fifth Dimension, p. 9).
Two) you say: “But the Real cannot be defined in terms of our conceptual repertoire. We can make purely formal, linguistically generated, statements about it (such as that it can be referred to), but we cannot properly either affirm or deny that it has any of the positive qualities captured in human language. We cannot say, for example, that it is personal or that it is impersonal; or again, that it is good or that it is evil, that it is a substance or a process, even that it is one or many. The binary dualisms in terms of which we think, although indispensable features of human thought, do not apply to the Ultimate” (ibid). But, you have never argued that why the Real is transcategorical; and why the Absolute Real cannot be defined in terms of our conceptual repertoire. This is only a claim; and there are different doctrines in this regard; and you are not a prophet so that your sayings may have so revelatory authority that others have to obey them. Thus, you should not expect that your claims to be accepted without any argument!
Three) Are terms such as “existence and nonexistence”, “good and evil”, “one and many” and the like real and meaningful or not? And is a part of these dualities able to represent a different reality and fact; a fact in whose existence or nonexistence our existence and nonexistence, idea and concept, proof and rejection, plays no role? For example, we say: “under any circumstances, lion exists, and lion is the strongest animal of the jungle, whether we (human beings) exist in the world or not, whether we have a mechanism called mind to conceive and imagine or not, whether we imagine the lion or not; whether we prove or reject existence of this animal and that it is the strongest animal, lion is the same. Or, the above concepts are not real representing reality, and we have posited them mentally?
If the first option is true, then there will be no reason to not apply those terms to the Absolute Reality; and if the second one is true, then we should be able to call “evil” whatever that is good and vice versa! And the point of one who regards God as “absolute evil” should be as intelligible and acceptable as that of the other who regards God as “pure good”? And, then, it should be said that catastrophes and evils are graces and good things!
Four) You say: “And so we resort to such terms as the Ultimate, Ultimate Reality, Absolute Reality, the Real, the Transcendent, the Divine, the Holy, the Eternal, the Infinite – with or without capitals” (Fifth Dimension, p. 9).
That various terms are used to describe the Real is never a reason for His transcategoricallity or man’s ignorance of Him or a sign that all terms used for Him are incorrect; but rather diversity of terms (of the kinds mentioned in above) may suggest mankind’s various kinds of knowledge of the Truth- the Exalted, and even none of the above term may be in conflict with the others. Each term has been regarded as representing an aspect of the reality of the Absolute Reality and one of His attributes. Using these terms, you and others admit that He is “Reality” and not illusion, Ultimate and consequently eternal and everlasting; He is Absolute then He is not restrained; He is being, then He is not nonbeing; He is Pre-Eternal, then He is not created; He is Infinite, then He is not finite…
Five) To claim that attributes of the Real cannot be expressed requires suspension of reason, suspension of reason from knowing the Real or suspension of the Essence of the Real from being qualified by His attributes. The doctrine of suspension is as baseless as anthropomorphism; for agnosticism requires us to not speak of the Real whether in affirmation or in negation! No agnostic is, however, committed to consequences of this doctrine [and cannot be]. For, to speak about the Real, in any way and however small, means to violate the doctrine. Even the sentence the Real “is ineffable” (Fifth Dimension, p. 9) is itself paradoxical; for it is itself some sort of expression. By this expression, you inform of, and describe, Him.
Six) you have not spoken of the sentence the Real “is ineffable” with no background; but rather, this sentence contains a theory which is in turn based on some propositions subject of all which is the Truth- the Exalted; and each of those propositions is an independent description of the Real; and to say this sentence, you have regarded those propositions as being certain. In other words, any negation originates from some positive presuppositions and affirmations which have been regarded as being certain.
Seven) You say that no negative and positive proposition may be applied to the Absolute Transconceptual Reality which is out of the scope of propositions.
Negative qualities are negations of negation; each and every negative quality negates a defect or nonexistence from the Divine realm; and negation of negation requires affirmation. And all negative qualities refer back to rejection of any possibility and need. Consequently, even negative qualities of the Real are some kind of affirmation.
Eight) If we do not understand negative qualities in this sense, they cannot be regarded as descriptions; for from pure negation no knowledge may originate. If you tell someone: “In my library, there is no table, no chair, no bench, no computer, …” he can never infer that “Then there is a TV”. Or if you tell someone that there is in my workroom something which is not table, chair, bench …, he will never find that it is a TV.
Nine) If no affirmative understanding of the Real can be attained, or if no affirmative description of Him may be provided, then did the prophets call people to the absolute unknown? And have the believers sought for the absolute unknown in the course of history? Or have they lived their lives in ignorance of their ignorance.
How may belief in, and seeking refuge in, the absolute unknown and ambiguous being be a caused for effects? How can one accept that belief in such a being- to which even the term “being” is not applied, and even it may be nonexistent- is a cause for salvation of mankind?
Ten) You say: “It is ineffable or, as I prefer to say, transcategorial – outside the scope of the categories with which we think. It (though ‘it’ is as inappropriate as ‘he’ or ‘she’) is what it is, but what it is does not fall within the scope of our human conceptual systems” (Fifth Dimension, p. 9).
This is like Plotinus’ saying that: “Strictly we should put neither a This nor a That to it” (Plotinus, Sixth Ennead, Ninth Tractate, 3). If He is the Absolute Unknown, how have you found that “He is” and He is not as we describe Him? The Absolute Unknown is absolutely unknown; it may be neither understood nor proved nor rejected; but you and we speak of Him abundantly, and say words and expressions which are meaningful; our audience understand our sayings as well; and, evidently, these concepts fall under human ones.
Eleven) Is the problem a linguistic one; in other words, are language and words unable to speak of Him? What is the exact meaning of the expression “it is ineffable”? Do you mean that words cannot describe Him even based on miracles and Divine will? Or, is the problem a conceptual problem; i.e. is it “incomprehensible”? And, the concept of the Real and what refers to it is so lofty that we cannot understand it? Or, its reference is so great and infinite that finite man is not able to understand it?
If problem is with language and words, then prophets who have been sent by God have not been able to speak of Him; then, they have never known Him; and religious sciences and ideas have been shaped concerning a thing which is absolutely unknown; and none of such sciences and ideas are not science or idea; but rather they are ignorance and invaluable! You will confirm that this is much more harmful that points mentioned by positivists and naturalists. Or when we say “God exists”, it is as if we say nothing? Is it as if that we say an ambiguous expression? Does this sentence mean “God does not exist”?
But none of these options is true. Otherwise, we will have to accept that prophets’ invitations have been meaningless; and the monotheists of the history have spoken senseless. Nor did their audience understand their sayings!
Problem is not in understanding of concepts. For, the sentence “God is Knower”, for example, means that He knows; “God is Potent” means that God is able; there is no ambiguity in such sentences and the like. And it is, of course, accepted that man’s knowledge and power is through the other, accidental, finite, and limited; but God’s knowledge and power- unlike those of man- are by essence, eternal, infinite, and limitless. And this is a referential, not conceptual, difference. Nor is man able to understand the external existence of the Truth- the Exalted. This, however, does not mean that he cannot understand concepts applicable to Him. I think that those who say that “it is ineffable” have fallen in the fallacy of confusion reference and concepts.
Twelve) Concerning knowledge of realities of the world and the Ultimate Reality and religion, you have introduced a surprising justification which I mention its problem in the end of this section in brief. You say: “…the true character of the universe does not force itself upon us, and we are left with an important element of freedom and responsibility in our response to it. From a religious point of view this connects with the thought that God leaves us free to respond or fail to respond to him” (Problems of Religious Pluralism, p. 25).
Firstly: knowledge is not limitation or prohibition that if it is acquired man’s freedom may be taken of him; but rather, man acquires freedom when he knows; knowledge does not negate free will; but rather man will act freely if he knows; for knowledge provides two options for man; but the ignorant one will either stop or will go only in one way; since he knows no other way so that he may choose; and that way may be most likely an erroneous one.
Secondly: If the Real does not subject Himself to man’s knowledge, He has hidden the truth; and seduced people by ignorance; and has taken of them the possibility to select from among truth and falsehood, monotheism and polytheism, religion and other than it; and has made them probably deprived of religiosity; and this is far from Divine wisdom, grace, and justice.
The Holy Quran has described this point in a beautiful manner. It has been said in the Chapter Insan: “Lo! We have shown him the way, whether he be grateful or disbelieving” (76: 3). According to the Holy Quran, knowledge does not lead to determinism, but brings about free will.
It seems that the verse “Naught is as His likeness” (42: 11) is to reject similarity between creatures and the Real; and this never means that He is ineffable and cannot be described. Evidence is that just after this sentence, God- the Exalted- has been described as Hearer and Seer.
Thirteen) You say that in the verse 11 of the Chapter Shura (Naught is as His likeness), a law has been imlicitly enacted according to which God, in His internal ultimate essence, accepts no human quality… Even, in long run, such qualities cannot be attributed to his internal mortal Essence; in other words, God’s names are not His Essence (Response to Dr. Recber, p. 12).
It is not right to attribute such a thing to Islam at all. The Holy Quran is full of Divine names and attributes. This Book says explicitly: “Allah’s are the fairest names. Invoke Him by them” (7: 180). In other words, you may describe Him by these names which are suggesting a beauty and perfection which is free from defects and possibilities. In the Holy Quran, God has been described thousands times and by almost 100 names and attributes. Divine names and attributes in the Holy Quran may be classified under three groups:
A) Names which are representatives of the Essence of the Real:
1- One, 2- the One, 3- the Inward, 4- the Most High, 5- deity, 6- the Greatest, 7- the Seer, 8- the Compeller, 9- the Truth, 10- the All-Wise, 11- Praised, 12- Alive, 13- Good, 14- Lord of Majesty, 15- Hearer, 16- the All peaceable, 17- the Impenetrable, 18- the Outward, 19- the Mighty, 20- the Knower, 21- the Great, 22- the High, 23- the Powerful, 24- the Omnipotent, 25- Mighty, 26- the King, 27- the Independent, 28- the Holy, 29- the Strong, 30- the Lord of Strength, 31- the Self-subsisting, 32- the Generous, 33- the All-subtle, 34- the Glorious, 35- the All-faithful, 36- the Protector, 37- the Manifest, 38- the Doer of what He will, 39- the Light.
B) Attributes which suggest kinds of relations between God and creatures, such as
1- The Creator, 2- the Maker, 3- the Originator, 4- the Lord, 5- the Sustaining, 6- the Owner, 7- the King, 8- the Sovereign, 9- Originator, 10- the Giver of life, 11- the Shaper, 12- the Cleaver, 13- the Maker, 14- the Creator of Death, 15- the Origin, 16- the Restorer (the last three attributes, of course, have been mentioned in the Holy Quran as verbs).
C) Attributes which represent relations between the Truth and man, such as:
1- The Most Merciful of all merciful, 2- the most just of Judges, 3- the speediest of Reckoners, 4- the Guardian, 5- the Reckoner, 7- the Watcher, 8- the Witness, 9- the Nigh, 10- the Encompasser, 11- the Determiner, 12- the Reigning, 13- the Friend, 14- the Helper, 15- the Guide (as verb), the Misleading (as verb), 19- the Benevolent, 20- the All-merciful, 21- the Merciful, 22- the Forgiver, 23- the All-forgiving, 24- the Repentant, 25- the All-loving, 26- the Clement, 27- the All-thankful, 28- the All-embracing, 29- the Giver, 30- the Lord of bounty, 31- the Swift at reckoning, 32- the Speediest of Reckoners, 33- the Terrible Reckoning, 34- the Sever in punishment, 35- the Mighty in Wrath, 36- the Avenger, 37- the Omnipotent, 38- the Dominant, 39- the Judge, 40- the Best of judges, 41- the Best of knowers (two last attributes represent the Real’s justice).
In some Islamic supplications such as Jawshan kabir, 1000 names and attributes have been mentioned for God. In Islamic philosophical, mystical, and theological sources, there is a profound and striking discussion concerning classification and semantics of Divine names and attributes which cannot be introduced within the scope of the present writing. Thus, I say that it is not possible to ascribe the doctrine of “ineffability” to Islam based on only one attribution such as “Glory be to God”.
The sentence “Naught is as His likeness” is to reject similarity between creatures and the Real; and this never means that He is ineffable or cannot be described; for just after this sentence, God- the Exalted- has been described as Hearer and Seer.
Verses like “Glorified be Allah from that which they [polytheists] attribute (unto Him)” (37: 159) and “Glorified is He, and High Exalted above what they say!” (17: 43) are sent to reject misunderstandings and glorification of the Real from false attributions made by polytheists including taking partners for Him (which in the previous verses have been mentioned); and they are never to forbid description or positive description.
Fourteen) As promised, in the end of this section, I will make a mention to the theory of Muslim philosopher, Mulla Sadra (16 AD/11 AH), concerning semantics of attributes. I think that his theory may be reported as follows in brief:
One) Attributes of the Real are divided into two groups: Affirmative and negative.
Two) Negative attributes negate “defect” and “nonexistence” of Him and refer to negation of possibility from the realm of the Real.
Three) Affirmative attributes are, in turn, divided into two classes: 1) “real” ones which describe the Essence of God- the Exalted- with no relation to His creatures, such as knowledge and life; 2) “relative” ones which describe the Real based on His relation to His creatures such as Creator-ness and Sustaining-ness.
Four) The real attributes refer back to His attribute of “necessity of being”, and relative attributes refer back to His attributes of “sovereignty”.
Five) Same attributes are ascribed to the Creator and creature as polysemies. For example the quality of knowing is ascribed to God and man in the same sense, but in a gradational manner. To explain, it should be said that just in the same way that all lights “from the weak light of candle to the strong light of the Sun, and lights between the two” are light, and we apply the term “light” in the same sense to all of them, and they do not differ in light-ness, and differ only in terms of weakness and strength, knowledge is applied in the same sense to all its (human and Divine) references; and references differ only in terms of weakness and strength. This is the case for all other attributes as well (Transcendent Philosophy in Four Intellectual Journeys, vol. 6, p. 120; and Sharh al-usul al-kafi, p. 298).
This is called the theory of “Univocality and existential gradation of attributes”; and, I think, it is one of the best theory concerning conceptology of attributes solving the problem of Divine anthropomorphism and deanthropomorphism. Mulla Sadra’s theory is based on his own philosophical principles here cannot be explained.
Fifteen) And finally, as said: doctrines of incomprehensibility of attributes and ineffability of the Real- the Exalted or belief in separation between attributes of the Creator and creatures as well as negative theology are among deanthropomorphist doctrines; and deanthropomorphism is one of the theories concerning Divine attribution and conceptology of His attributes. And this is a theological issue which is evidently regarded as an intra-religious one; religious pluralism, however, as you noted repeatedly, is a philosophical issue (Fifth Dimension, p. 96); and consequently, it is an extra-religious discussion. Now I ask: “Dear Mr. John Hick! May an important philosophical claim be founded on a minor point taken from a particular theological attitude?”
Three) Employing Similes and Allegories instead of Giving Arguments
One of the weaknesses of which your theory of religious pluralism suffers is extreme employment of similes and allegories. I mean extreme employment of allegories and similes to prove claims of the theory: “the allegory of elephant and blind men” (Problems of Religious Pluralism, p. 37); “seeing through a glass darkly” (ibid., p. 39), Rumi’s allegory of “different lamps but the same light” (An Interpretation of Religion …, p. 233), Junayd’s allegory of “the color of water is the same as its container” (ibid., p. 241); analogizing to two particle and wave theory of light (ibid., p. 245), analogizing to different lenses (Problems of Religious Pluralism, p. 92), fork and knife (Dialogues in the Philosophy of Religion, p. 105), “ambiguous pictures such as Justrow’s duck-rabbit” (ibid.), “two dimensional representation of the three dimensional globe” (ibid, p. 200), analogizing Divine grace to sunlight which, according to exclucivism, “can only fall on other planets by being first reflected from the earth (Problems of Religious Pluralism, p. 53).

Professor!
You are well-aware that similes and allegories are suitable only to bring the claim close to the mind and facilitate understanding; but they never prove truth of the claim; for simileis “generalization and application of a proposition concerning a particular to the other one, while the reason behind proposition is not known and there is no certain common point between the two”. In metaphor or comparison as well, there may be some similarities between the original thing and that which is compared to it in some aspects; in other aspects, however, there may be many dissimilarities. That is why they have said though metaphor brings one close to the point in some aspect, in many aspects it keeps him far from the point .
This writing is not suitable for introduction and sufficient explanation of this methodological mistake. To show insufficiency of similes to prove the claim, I suffice to analyze the tale of elephant and blind men- which is frequently appealed to in epistemological discussions, and you have appealed to it repeatedly.
First) Against the above parable, we may mention the other one according to which truth is attainable, though (and even) by chance or through imitation or by ignorant conducts. In the second book of his Mathnawi, Mevlana speaks of a man who has lost his camel and is searching for his lost camel, desert by desert, town by town; and another man, without losing his camel, is imitatively, or to ridicule him, accompanying him claiming that he has lost his camel as well! Whatever the former says or asks, and whenever he runs, the imitating lying man says or asks, and runs.
When the truthful man, after knowingly attempts, finds his lost camel, he sees that there are two camels; and suddenly the imitating ignorant man notices that one of them is his own camel, but he has not known that his camel had been lost; and truly he has not been searching for the camel and he has found there his camel accidentally! From this story Rumi concludes that “When a liar set out (to journey) with a truthful man, his falsehood turns to truth of a sudden
“That imitator became a true searcher when he saw his camel browsing there .
Second) the parable (of elephant and blind men) is to reject authenticity of senses to acquire knowledge, and to criticize sense-sufficiency or to emphasize the necessity of appropriateness between tools of knowledge and subject of knowledge; and notes that true knowledge of the members of elephant is possible through the vision and not by hand and touching faculty.
Third) if the object of knowledge is the elephant and not its members (which is typically what is considered), the parable is to show defects and inefficiency of one-dimensional and particularist views in acquisition of knowledge, i.e. a defect of which suffer most human hypotheses and theories –in particular in our time-; knowledge of the elephant, which is a whole, is possible through a universal-seeing eye (an eye which sees beyond and comprehensively). In other words, the whole truth is grasped through a universal-seeing philosophical look and not through empiric attempts which are praticularist and one-dimensional. That is why to conclude from this parable, Mevlana says:
“On account of the (diverse) place (object) of view, their statements differed: one man entitled it “d’al,” another “alif”
“If there had been a candle in each one’s hand, the difference would have gone out of their words
“The eye of sense-perception is only like the palm of the hand: the palm hath not power to reach the whole of him (the elephant) . Rumi emphasizes that mistake committed by, and difference between, blind men were caused by superficialism, obstinacy, and selfishness of blind men and their negligence of esoteric points and guidance made by the spiritual guide.
“If a master of the esoteric had been there, a revered and many language man, he would pacified them.
Fourth) if the object of knowledge is elephant, the parable will not prove that each and every knowing subject has acquired a portion of reality (even though negligible) and knows one of the dimensions of the elephant. For, in this parable none of the touching men has understood a part or dimension of the truth; and even they have gone further from the truth and all of them have equally committed mistakes; and their states are much worse than those who have not yet touched the elephant. For the latter ones have no imagination of the elephant; but those who have touched the elephant have misunderstood him; and simple ignorance is less worse than the complicated ignorance. For the simple ignorance may be likened to the ground zero, while complicate ignorance is like a position under the ground zero!
Fifth) even if we accept that blind men’s knowledge shares a portion of truth, that truth is not a truth concerning the elephant; but rather the truth acquired by each one of them is a knowledge concerning the member touched by him. In this case, each one of them has come relatively close to the truth concerning his own object of knowledge; for he has, at least, understood corporality, sensibility, its form and volume, hardness … of the body touched by him.
(Anyway, as seen, a parable may be interpreted in various ways and suggest different and even conflicting claims; in any case, this parable does not suggest critical realism, we do not mention religious pluralism).
Sixth) If a single parable refers to a single claim, claims made in some of your parables are in conflict with claims made in others; parable is, in principle, suitable to motivate imagination not to cause reasoning; and simile is a figure of speech not a philosophical art. And finally parable does not refer to naïve realism, we do not speak of religious pluralism.
Four) Providing Non-Philosophical Arguments and Evidence for Philosophical Claims

Dear Mr. John Hick
You know that in any epistemic realm scientific research requires using its own language, methodology, principles, arguments, and evidence. To confuse borders of sciences is followed by improper scientific consequences and, in addition, it is some sort of logical fallacy. To prove a philosophical claim, one cannot pose a moral argument; and to prove a theological point, one should not appeal to mystical rules and social evidence.
Religious pluralism is a philosophical point and even a philosophical approach to religious studies; and its claims should be proved in a philosophical language and manner, and based upon philosophical principles and rational arguments and evidence; but you have never observed this important point!
To prove your claims all of which are philosophical and should be philosophical, you have repeatedly and abundantly appealed to theological, mystical, moral, social, and historical arguments and evidence! In what follows I mention some examples:
A) Appeal to the doctrine of “ineffability” of the Real- the Exalted- which is, as said, a theological view, to explain principles of religious pluralism; you are well-aware that effability or ineffability is one of the oldest theological issues which has been discussed for more than thousand years by various theological Jew, Christian, and Islamic schools. How have you taken it as a basis to introduce your philosophical theory?
B) Arguing based on “the paradox of a God of universal love … who has ordained only a minority of the human race can be saved” to prove necessity of a “Copernican Revolution” in theology (Problems of Religious Pluralism, p. 99). In what follows I will make clearer that the two are not necessarily related, and reveal the confusion and mistake committed by you in expressing your own claim.
C) Appeal to theological readings of Resurrection to argue and make grounds to prove the philosophical theory of religious pluralism (ibid., Chapters 8 and 9).
D) Your works ate full of appeals to claims made by mystics and mystical points to explain and prove religious pluralism (ibid., p. 108). But either mysticism and religion are two parallel ways or mysticism is a part of religion; anyway, mysticism is other than philosophy, and it should not be regarded as an argument to prove philosophical claims.
E) Moral Arguments to prove claims made by religious pluralism, for example you quote from Mr. Peter Byrne to regard exclusivism as being immoral (ibid., p. 102).
F) Appeal to “national and climatic acceptance of religion” by people to prove truth of religious pluralism, i.e. going from a historical phenomenon to a philosophical and epistemic claim! Can one make a philosophical or epistemological inference from conducts of people which might have been done because of a variety of non-epistemic causes? Can we say that “people decide so, and then they decide correctly”? Is people’s decision a rational or religious argument to which one may appeal to prove a philosophical or religious claim?
G) To base “equal truth of religions” (which is the foundation of your theory) on the “external plurality of religions”. Is it right to say “Since they exist then they are true”? Have not “truth” and “falsehood” existed in the course of history in parallel? Can we say “they have always existed, then the two are equal”? Or, are all various and numerous religions and quasi-religions true since they have been accepted by people? This argument is going from a social phenomenon to a philosophical claim. And, is not this a logical fallacy or philosophical circle that to prove truth, and consequently legitimacy of people’s surrender to religions and that they should be protected we argue from people’s acceptance and adherence?
Five) To Provide Cause instead of Giving Argument
To describe why and how there are many religions does not show that all existing religions are true or equally true, or they should be necessarily confirmed and retained. Similarly, to go from social pragmatism and moral advices to philosophical claims is a striking methodological mistake. For, this is to go from “ought”‘s and “may be”‘s to “is”s and “is not”s! Description of the formation of the ideal of religious pluralism in the Article “Three Controversies” (Problems of Religious Pluralism, pp. 1-15), social functions of the theory (Ibid, p 108), reformist revisions in some famous ideas of Christianity and interpretations of some religious issues in harmony with pluralism (ibid., p. 12) ; and above all, your explicit and repeated confessions dispersed in your articles and books that you have gone in this way knowingly, show that such a methodology has been employed to found and prove the theory.
For example, these sentences of yours may be mentioned: “And it has been one of my vocations as a theologian to work for the new kind of theology of religions which is implied by the new praxis. This seems to me to involve a frank recognition that there is a plurality of divine revelations and contexts of salvation” (Problems of Religious Pluralism, p. 11).
“In many places men, women and even children are killing and being killed in conflicts that are both validated and emotionally intensified by religion. And this is possible because each faith has traditionally made its own absolute claim to be the one and only true faith. Absolutes can justify anything. Today, to insist on the unique superiority of your own faith is to be part of the problem. For how can there be stable peace between rival absolutes? In the words of the Catholic theologian Hans Kung, ‘There will be no peace among the peoples of this world without peace among the world religions’. And I would add that there will be no real peace among the world religions so long as each thinks of itself as uniquely superior to all the others. Dialogue between the faiths must continue on an ever increasing scale. But the only stable and enduring basis for peace will come about when dialogue leads to a mutual acceptance of the world religions as different but equally valid relationships to the ultimate reality” .
Six) To Present a Caused Claim as an Argued One
This objection is very similar to the fifth one; but there is a subtle difference between the two. The fifth objection discusses insufficiency of replacement of argument by cause; the sixth objection, however, concerns some sort of logical fallacy. That is why it is taken into account separately.
In the period of after the world war II, and for historical and moral reasons and social pragmatism (as you have admitted) as well as humanitarian reasons, you have come to the theory of religious pluralism; and then decided to prove it for all costs as a priori belief. The article Three Controversies shows this point clearly.
The long list of objections and methodological problems mentioned in above as well as some other objections which I will discuss in what follows provide us with sufficient pieces of evidence to prove the methodological mistake of the theory.
Seven) Other Problems with the Theory in Methodology and Argumentation
So far, I discussed six kinds of methodological problems in your explanation and justification of your theory (1- introduction of philosophical claims with no argument; 2- avoidance from scientific encounter to the arguments posed by the opponent; 3- appeal to analogies and similes instead of arguments; 4- introduction of intra-religious and non-philosophical arguments for an extra-religious and philosophical claim, to provide cause instead of arguments; 6- to present a caused claim as an argued one).
The theory suffers other methodological defects and problems such as the followings:
1- To Regard as argument what is not an argument; or separation of argument from the claim;
2- To provide a particular argument for a universal claim
3- To provide a universal argument for a particular claim (and non-commitment to all consequences of the universal argument);
4- Appeal to incoherent and conflicting arguments.
To avoid verbiage, I will not introduce and explain these problems and defects; and in what follows, I will criticize the epistemological foundation of your theory.

Chapter Three:
Critique of Epistemological Foundation of the Theory

In the An Interpretation of Religion (page 240) you have said:
“In developing this thesis, our chief philosophical resource will be one of Kant’s most basic epistemological insights, namely the mind actively interprets sensory information in terms of concepts, so that the environment as we consciously perceive and inhabit is our familiar three – dimensional world of objects interacting in space…” (Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, p 240).
Then, you have continued:
“The basic principle I am adapting from Kant’s philosophy was in fact already succinctly stated long before by St Thomas Aquinas, although without any thought of the kind of application being proposed here, when he wrote that ‘Things known are in the knower according to the mode of the knower,…
I want to apply the same principle to faith understood (as in Chapter 10.2) in a very different way, as the interpretive element within all awareness of our environment; and to argue that in relation to the divine the ‘mode of the knower’ differs within different religious- cultural systems so that the Righteous is thought – and – experienced in a wide variety of ways. A near contemporary of St Thomas, the Muslim thinker al Junaid, drew precisely this conclusion in a metaphor which he applied to the plurality of forms of awareness of God: ‘The color of the water is the same as that of its container’” (ibid., p. 240-1).
In your Problems of Religious Pluralism (Chapter 6, p. 92), you have said:
“…we should add this fundamental epistemological principle as well that our knowledge in relation to reality external to our existence is always based on a number of concepts that reveal our cognitive consciousness and sagacity – a principle that initially has crept into Europe’s new thinking through Kant but later was endorsed and expanded in psychology.
To this distinction we have to add the basic epistemological principle, introduced into modern European thought by Kant but confirmed and developed in modern psychology, sociology of knowledge and the philosophy of science, that we are always aware of reality beyond ourselves in terms of the sets of concepts which structure our own cognitive consciousness. And the different religious traditions, with their different conceptual systems, methods of worship or meditation, and lifestyles, nourished by different scriptures and supported by their respective communal matrices, constitute the ‘Lenses’ through which different human faith – communities variously perceive the divine Reality”.
Dear Professor! You have based your theory on Kantian epistemology and thus you have linked the fate of your theory to that of this epistemic model. In this way, you have made its subsistence and survival dependent on subsistence and survival of Kantian epistemology. And, in addition to providing replies for objections posed against your theory, you have to inevitably provide solutions for problems of Kant’s epistemological doctrine. Thus, in this chapter, while discussing the epistemological foundation of your theory, we will discuss Kant’s epistemology in brief. I arrange this chapter in three parts:
The First Part) Similarities and Dissimilarities between You and Kant
Points of this part are introduced in four paragraphs:
One) Kantian epistemology does not accept pluralism; for, Kant’s theory is based on “unity of reality” and “unity of knowledge”, though he does not think that knowledge corresponds to reality; plurality and acceptance of plurality, however, are the essence of all kinds of pluralism. As you know, he believes that the external world is real and one; the material of knowledge enters the mind from the external world; and man’s epistemic system will shape it through categories. Innate and a priori processes and categories which shape knowledge are the same in all human beings. Thus, in perceiving the external world, all men and women will commit mistakes steadily and equally. Thus, according to Kant, there is no plurality in the station of existence (ontology) and station of knowledge (epistemology) so that some kind of pluralism may be imagined based on his theory.
Two) Perhaps because of the above point, like Neo-Kantians, you have tried to provide an extremist interpretation of Kant’s epistemology. In Kant’s theory, doubt is put forward between “reality” and knowledge” (the main point of Kant is non-correspondence between noumenon and phenomenon as well as duality of knowledge and reality). In your theory, however, doubt between knowledge and reality remains and, in addition, doubt between each kind of knowledge and other kinds of knowledge is at stake. To provide some basis to justify religious pluralism, in addition to accepting that knowledge does not represent reality, you have inevitably accepted diversity of, and difference between, kinds of knowledge. Consequently, [it may be said] that if Kant, unwillingly and unknowingly, has fallen in skepticism, you are suffering- unwillingly and unknowingly- skepticism concerning “possibility of knowing reality”; and in addition, you have fallen in relativism concerning religious knowledge(!!) though both you and Kant emphasize possibility of knowledge, and do not accept to be attributed by skepticism and relativism, and dislike such an attribution seriously. (in what follows I will both your and Kant’s views in details and separately).
Three) There are endless differences between Kant’s theory and epistemological principles of your religious pluralism which we mention some of them in what follows:
1- Having made distinction between noumenon and phenomenon and explained the relation between object (thing out of the essence) and mind (thing in the essence), roles played by time and place, and his twelve innate categories, concerning formation of knowledge Kant has introduced a limited and concrete mechanism. But you have not managed to enlist the factors involving in knowledge, and specify the way and extent that they exercise their impacts. Thus, your religious pluralism lacks a consistent epistemological basis; undetermined, inconsistent, and unstable plurality of factors involving in formation of religious knowledge and understanding the Ultimate Reality has led to plurality of undetermined, inconsistent, and infinite plurality of religious traditions, and stricken your theory by the crisis of “challenge of standard”!
2- You have not clarified whether only culture and lifestyles or only civilization, or only climate, or only history, or manifestation of the Ultimate Reality or … have created religious traditions or a combination of them has produced them. If the latter, a combination of all of them or a combination of some of them with each other? And which of them with which others? In either case, do they play equal and similar roles? If no, to what extent each one of them contributes? And taking into account synthesis of culture of dozens and even hundreds different factors and parts (beliefs, emotions, conventions, habits, moralities, norms, values, myths and the like), combination of each group with the other one will create a special culture, which culture will produce a religious tradition? (and many other questions remain open in your principles!)
3- According to Kant’s theory, reality is guessed, and man is not in absolute ignorance (in what follows, I will show that according to his theory many pieces of information and even known things may be acquired, though he himself does not know the point). Your pluralism, however, is based on negative theology; and for you, the Ultimate Reality is in the absolute ambiguity.
4- Similarly, according to Kant, because of the stability of the process of formation of knowledge as well as the fact that factors involving in it are determined and limited, noumenon has only one manifestation. In your epistemological view, however, because of diversity of factors influencing knowledge, reality may have endless and even conflicting manifestations.
5- Kant does not think that there are many realities; but you think since the Ultimate Reality is judged based on popular mental and linguistic rules and judgments and even judgments such as “unity” and “plurality” cannot be applied to it, then the Ultimate Reality may be in fact plural! For, though you have said many times that religious traditions are manifestations of a single reality; the truth is that you depict many realities as the Ultimate Reality, which never may be regarded as references of a single reality. how may personal and impersonal be regarded as references of a single reality?
6- Categories of Kant’s a priori epistemology are mental and internal; for you, however, factors involving in formation of religious traditions are external.
7- Your sayings are always full of doubt. Sometimes you regard religions and religious traditions as various manifestations of the Ultimate Reality; some other times you consider religions as products of diversity of cultures or civilizations, or nations, or families… Anyway, there is an important difference between you and Kant. Kant thinks that in the process of formation of knowledge, the mind plays an active role; but you think that it is passive. In other words, you think that it is not the subject who produces knowledge; according to Kant, however, the mind of the subject plays the main role in the formation of knowledge.
8- In Kant’s epistemology, factors (categories) involving in formation of knowledge are of the kind of knowledge; for, they are among philosophical or logical intelligibles. You think, however, that it is mainly non-epistemic factors such as culture, lifestyles, nationality, history, society, family and the like (each of which consists of many non-epistemic parts) which play the main role in formation of knowledge.
Four) There are many common point between two readings (those of Kant and you); for example:
1- Both of you believe in “impossibility of knowledge”; for you think knowledge of formless “thing in itself”, including the Ultimate Reality, is impossible; if this is the case for all kinds of knowledge- which Kant assumes so-, there is no justification for exception of some realities; knowledge will be absolutely impossible, and this is the same as “impossibility of knowledge”.
2- For both of you, formation of knowledge may be referred back to characteristics of man (or concrete man: man plus factors involving in formation of knowledge); and human characteristics are regarded as origins of knowledge; then, epistemologies of both of you is a humanist one. Though- as said- sometimes you mention various manifestations of the Ultimate Reality in different cultures and, thus, emphasize the role played by the object in formation of knowledge.
In spite of many differences which, I think, exist between Kant’s epistemic theory and your own epistemic foundation- some of which were mentioned- because of your insistence to found your religious pluralism on Kant’s epistemic model, let me at first discuss Kantian epistemology in brief; then, I will go to discuss your epistemological foundations.
Part Two) A Brief Critique of Kant
One) If the bare reality cannot be faced, and all epistemic understandings of all human beings go through the channel of time and place, and then and inevitably are formed in the homogenous formats of Kant’s twelve a priori categories, and perception of no man is an exception to this rule, and mankind suffers methodological mistakes, it may be asked how Kant- and only Kant- managed to go out of this essentially consistent human train or tunnel which accepts no exception, and evaluate realities far from influences of the mechanism that he has depicted, and find incoherence between noumenon and phenomenon, and see all realities as they are, and compare them with their epistemic forms, and recognize the difference between them, then come in the train and addressed mankind to make him aware of his eternal mistake!! Is Kant God or His chosen servant who has been extraordinarily excepted from the process of creation and [attainment of] knowledge? If one manages to find a way out of the eternal prison to look at realities as they are, others will manage to do so as well.
Two) The main challenge faced by Kant and all epistemic skepticists and relativists is the challenge of “self-destruction”. For, the proposition “no proposition corresponds to reality” is itself an epistemic one, and if it is taken in its absolute sense, it will cover itself; then this proposition itself does not correspond to reality. And if so, then other propositions will correspond to reality!; and if we except this proposition from its own rule, then there will be at least a proposition which corresponds to reality. It a proposition which represents reality is possible, why should we think that other propositions which represent reality are not possible?!
Three) To accept Kantian theory of knowledge, one has to accept that there are many propositions which represent reality; for example:
1- Things exists independent from our minds; they are not nonexistent or illusive.
2- Noumena of things are “determined” and “stable”.
3- Noumena of things are different from their phenomena.
4- Our perception of things in themselves is erroneous, and our knowledge [of them] does not correspond to their realities.
5- The external, noumenal things are causes of our knowledge of them.
6- Things in themselves are not the whole cause of our knowledge, but rather a part of causes of the formation of knowledge.
7- The assumed process and mechanism is another part of the formation of knowledge.
8- The external things play their roles in such a way that each and every thing causes its own phenomenon; there is appropriateness between “noumenon” and “phenomenon”.
9- Though noumena cannot be perceived totally, our knowledge will hit them; kinds of knowledge are not absurd and random.
10- There is (and even are) subject(s) out of our minds.
11- Subject is other then “knowledge” and “the known”.
12- Subject possesses mind and epistemic system.
13- Epistemic system may be objected.
14- Knowledge exists, it is not illusion.
15- Knowledge is formed through a special process.
16- Knowledge is a product of that special process; evidently, it is other than subject, the known, and “process of knowledge”.
17- Knowledge may be objected.
18- The process of knowledge may be objected.
19- Some kinds of knowledge have been realized.
20- A knowledge which does not represent reality is other than the one which does so.
21- A knowledge which represents reality, if it is possible and realized, possesses corresponding truth.
22- There are minds other than mine in the external world.
23- There are intra-mental concepts.
24- Knowledge acquired by men and women of the same thing is the same.
25- Reason or mind possesses epistemic abilities.
26- Reason or mind suffers some inabilities.
27- Time and place are products of the mind.
28- There are exactly twelve categories.
29- Twelve categories are a priori.
And many other propositions

Now I ask:
Do such propositions represent reality? If yes, then the proposition “no proposition represent reality” is false; and, if even they do not represent reality, his theory will be falsified; for these propositions are descriptions of his theory or required by it. If these propositions do not represent reality, why and how do we analyze all epistemic points within them?
Four) If all perceptions of mankind are governed by Kantian unexceptionable process and rules, why are there so differences between kinds of knowledge? In other words, if “the factory producing knowledge” works as Kant says, its products should be similar and in the same form; but, this is not the case.
Five) because of the determining role which Kant considers for the structure of mind and “mentally made” categories which form knowledge, his theory will lead but to “subjectivism” and some sort of idealism; the phrase “Copernican Revolution of knowledge” shows that he has fallen in subjectivism. (this critique I have loaned from Russell; The History of the Western Philosophy, vol. 3, p. …).
Six) Insistence upon incoherence between noumenon and phenomenon as well as difference between knowledge and reality does not show that the two correspond relatively to each other; but rather, it means that knowledge is not knowledge; and this is the same as skepticism. The main problem with Kant’s theory lies in the system of his epistemology not in parts of his epistemological claims. The problem with his theory is like the problem with one who has asked address of an apartment; the guide, however, has misrepresented the city, not alley or number of the apartment. If in the address, instead of Tehran, Paris is mentioned, even if the name of street and number of the apartment is exactly correct, it will be of no use for one who seeks to find that apartment.
Seven) If the external world is not reflected in our mind as it is, what reflects in our mind- whatever it may be- is other than the external world; and there will be no identity between knowledge and reality; and the external thing cannot be said to be known. As a result, what we have is not “knowledge”, but rather “un-knowledge”.
Eight) If, as Kant thinks, causality is a mental concept and a mentally-posited form, then there is no causality in the external world. Then, why does he say: “there are essences in the external world which causes manifestations”?! And does not the sentence “each and every manifestation requires one who makes it manifest” mean that knowledge is caused by the external world? (I have loaned this critique from Schopenhauer).
Third Part) Critique of the Epistemological Foundation of the Theory
Now, I go to discuss epistemological foundations of your theory, and introduce some points in this regard in brief:
One) Kantian or Neo-Kantian epistemological model (to the latter you are more inclined), if can survive critiques posed against it, may uttermost be suitable to explain “the process of religious knowledge” (i.e. a knowledge acquired by attempts made to understand a religion, and kinds of knowledge acquired from all religions), provide definition for “the nature of religious knowledge”, and justify “plurality of readings of a single religion”, not to judge truth of a religion (or religions).
Kantian and Neo-Kantian theories are epistemological, not ontological, ones; religion in the noumenal world and the noumenal religion do not suffer separation between noumenon and phenomenon. more than seeking to justify plurality of knowledge of the same religion, religious pluralism seeks to justify the issue of other religions and explain the reason behind plurality of religions.
Two) To justify all religions and show that they are right and, thus, pave the way for religious pluralism, one cannot appeal to Kantian or Neo-Kantian explanation of knowledge; for, to insist upon separation between noumenon and phenomenon, take “phenomenon” and “noumenon” as being different and opposite to each other, and emphasize that attainment of “the Ultimate Reality in itself” is impossible will lead, instead of proving that all religious traditions are equally right- which is the basis of your religious pluralism and sought by it-, to falsification of all religious traditions and all kinds of religious knowledge.
Three) To insist that all different and even conflicting religious traditions and all kinds of religious knowledge are right and equal will, in principle, lead to falsification of all traditions and kinds of knowledge; for certainty of each option is the same as falsification of its rival options. If we insist simultaneously upon truth of two conflicting options we will falsify both of them; and, through some sort of combined consensus, we will falsify all traditions and kinds of knowledge!
Four) To claim transformation from “self-centredness” to “Reality-centredness”- which you have called “Copernican revolution in …theology of religions”- is in fact transformation from “Reality centredness” to “Selves-centrredness = “kinds of knowledge”-centredness”; and even- in particular according to Neo-Kantian reading of knowledge-, it is transformation from both “self-centredness” and “Reality-centredness” to “all things-centredness” and even and at least illusions-centredness. Instead of corresponding religious knowledge to the reality of religion, you try to correspond the reality of religion to religious knowledge (kinds of knowledge); and instead of insistence upon unveiling “reality of religion” and the real religion, you try to take all claims- even if loose ones- made under the name of religion as being true ones, and bring them into the club of religions, and thus, cover them by religious pluralism!!! And more than this (as I will say in what follows) having accepted Kantian epistemology, which is an idealist and skepticist epistemology, you have regarded some un-realities as realities, and some kinds of un-knowledge as knowledge, and replace the real religion by them.
In the “self-centredness” approach, some right views and understandings may be acquired; and those believing in it may go in the straight path; others, if concerned with truth, instead of being contend with what they have, will be courage to seek for truth, and some day they may acquire it. In the “all things-centredness”, however, all people will be contended with what they have, and will never doubt in what they have. In this way they will be ignorant of their ignorance forever; and will lose their chance to be guided forever.
Five) Have you ever thought that to attain your pre-decided goal (justification of universal truth of all religions and quasi-religions) Hegel’s epistemic model- apart from its truth or falsehood- is more suitable? I mean the doctrine of “What is rational is actual and what is actual is rational” (Hegel, Philosophy of Right, Preface).
Six) Professor! Let me to talk with you as a theist; based on “Kantian epistemological” foundations as well as “negative theology” upon which as two main bases for justification of religious pluralism you insist, no one will be ever able to find religious truth and true religion as they are. Now, I ask: “Was God able to create man’s perceptional apparatus so that attainment of knowledge of realities including religious realities as they are might be possible for man or not?”, “If He was able, why did not do so?”, “is this consistent with His wisdom, justice, and grace?”; “why did God do against wisdom and make mankind deprived of attainment of guidance and truth (God forbid!)?”, and “if the Real- the Exalted- has been unable to create an efficient apparatus to perceive realities, is not this a sign of non-necessity of His existence and even His nonexistence?”
Seven) In Philosophy Made Simple (Richard Henry Popkin, Avrum Stroll; p. 145), it has been said: “Hence, any effort to discuss and reason about the realm of the self, the thing in itself, or God, becomes, for Kant, only an unfortunate dialectical illusion”, I think this point is quietly right. According to Kantian epistemology, one will never understand God and religious realities; and the “understood God” is nothing but a product of man’s mind- which you have many times confessed this point and even insisted upon it; and, according to Kantian-Hickian epistemology, the world exists for us as we think of it!!!
Now, I ask: “do you think of transformation, which is, according to you, a standard for truth of religions and their competence to be covered by religious pluralism, as a product of belief in an illusive god and adherence to findings which are combinations of the object and subject? Can such a thing be regarded as an origin for transformation?” A transformation influenced by illusion!! You refer transformation to “transformation from self-centredness to Reality centredness”. Kant, however, bases ideas of all things on man and his perceptional apparatus. You have falsified Wittgenstein’s theory of language games since it harms realism concerning the language of religion and religious beliefs and rites, and said correctly: “On the other hand, however, in doing this it (in my view) cuts the heart out of that religious belief and practice. For the importance of religious beliefs to the believer lies ultimately in the assumption that they are substantially true references to the nature of reality; and the importance of religious L- practices to the practitioner lies in the assumption that through them one is renewing or deepening one’s relationship to the transcendent divine Reality” (Problems of Religious Pluralism, p. 16).
Also, I ask: “when because of non-realism, certainty will leave man’s heart, is faith possible? The object of faith should be determinate not illusive!
You say: “If I had been born in India, I would probably be a Hindu; if in Egypt, probably a Muslim; if in Ceylon, probably a Buddhist; but I was born in England and am, predictably, a Christian” (Philosophy of Religion).
Does this point justify that religions are equally true or lead to salvation? And does it confirm correctness of acts and faiths of the followers of these religions? No. This claim is like the claim that we say a child has been born to an advanced, moral, respected, and noble family and will become probably an advanced, polite, respectful, and sober one; and, another child has been born to a base, tentless, and unfounded family and will become probably a corrupt and tentless man unaware of civil conducts; then, we say since they have had nothing to do with their situations, they are not obliged to change their situations; but rather they have to retain the existing situation.
Does this mean that the two children will never notice difference between their situations? And if they notice, they will never be able to change their situations? The history of religious and epistemic developments testifies that this is not the case; your life is a clear violation of this doctrine; for, as you have said, in spite of circumstances in your birthplace and despite “conservative, cautious, timid and credulous” nature, your “intellect has nevertheless led me to various conclusions which do not fit well with such a temperament” (Problems of Religious Pluralism, p. 1) , you have rebelled against all well-known, accepted ideas of your birthplace [including Christian religious exclusivism], depicted a new picture, paid its costs be being accused and prosecuted for more than half a century.
Nine) To explain and justify religious pluralism you have appealed to various epistemological models simultaneously; taking into account differences between these models, it may be said that this treatment confirms again that you are trying to make acceptable your pre-determined decision to prove your claimed religious pluralism at any cost, even through appeal to conflicting arguments and ways!! This is quietly unscientific, and makes your theory liable to be harmed. In conclusion of this chapter, I will discuss, as an example, your appeal to Wittgenestian theory of “two kinds of running” in brief:
(Please accept my apologies since I have to quote long passages from you to remind you of your ideas and describe them for my readers). You have introduced and criticized the theory of language games concerning the language of religion texts , referred to Neo-Wittgenestian philosophy of religion, said that “… the neo- Wittgensteinian philosophy of religion embodies a misinterpretation of religion, and possibly also a misinterpretation of Wittgenstein’s utterances on religion” (ibid., p. 17). You have emphasized:
“There is however another aspect of Wittgenstein’s work that has, I believe, constructive implications for the philosophy of religion. This is his discussion of ‘seeing-as’ and related topics in the second part of the Philosophical Investigations. I want to suggest that this helps us to place the distinctively religious way of experiencing life on the epistemological map as a form of what I shall call ‘experiencing-as’; and helps us to understand religious faith, in its most basic sense, as the interpretative element within This distinctively religious way of experiencing life”.
In the next page, you continue:
“Wittgenstein points to two senses of the word ‘see’. If I am looking at a picture. say the picture of a face, in sense number one I see what is physically present on the paper- mounds of ink, we might say, of a certain shape, size, thickness and position. But in sense number two I see the picture of a face. We could say that in this second sense to ‘see’ is to interpret or to find meaning or significance in what is before us – we interpret and perceive the mounds of ink as having the particular kind of meaning that we describe as being the picture of a face, a meaning that mounds of ink, simply as such, do not have. The interpretative activity which is integral to ‘seeing’ in this second sense, but which is absent from ‘seeing’ in the first sense, is particularly evident when we are looking at a puzzle picture. .4s Wittgenstein says, ‘we see it as we interpret it’.’ As he also puts it, in seeing-as an element of thinking is mixed with pure ‘seeing’ in the first sense… But another kind of report is also possible, using such higher-level concepts as duck-rabbit picture as a duck and then as a rabbit Wittgenstein speaks of these as aspects, and he says that ‘the flashing of an aspect on us seems half visual experience, half thought” (ibid., p. 18-9).
We can, I suggest, immediately expand the concept of seeing-as, based only on sight, into the comprehensive notion of experiencing-as. For the finding of meaning does not occur only through sight”
To continue your explanation of Wittgenstein’s theory, apply it to readings of religion, and pave the way to prove religious pluralism on the basis of Wittgenstein’s view, you have said:
“Wittgenstein himself seems to have been inclined to restrict the notion of seeing-as to manifestly ambiguous cases, such as puzzle-pictures. It would not, he says, make sense for me ‘to say at the sight ofa knife and fork “Now I am seeing this as a knife and fork
… One doesn’t “take” what one knows as the cutlery at a meal for cutlery.” On the other hand he recognises that there are occasions when I would not say ‘I am seeing this as an x ‘ , but when nevertheless someone else might properly say of me, ‘He is seeing that as an x.’ And this is true, I would suggest, even of the ordinary everyday seeing-as, or experiencing-as, in which we recognise familiar objects such as knives and forks. If a stone-age savage is shown the cutlery he will not see it as cutlery because he lacks the concepts, which are part of our culture but not of his? Of cutlery, knife, fork, and so on, together with such other surrounding concepts as eating at table with manufactured implements. We could therefore say of him, ‘He is not experiencing it as cutlery’- but, perhaps, as something utterly puzzling or maybe as a set of magical objects. .4nd in contrast we could say of a member of our own culture, ‘He/she is seeing it as cutlery” (ibid., p. 19-20).

But, Dear Mr. Hick
Firstly: knife and fork are, in fact, knife and fork; and one who sees them as knife and fork is right, not the other who, because of ignorance of the natures of the two tools, thinks of them as things puzzling or maybe as a set of magical objects. Fork is in all conditions fork, and knife is knife, and nothing else. Thus, aware ones do not think o fork as knife, or of knife as fork. For them, none of such objects is a magical one.
Because of ignorance of the stone-age savage, his strange and false understanding cannot be regarded as being equal to correct understanding of the knowing one; and think that both of them are equally true. This is the case for the parable of duck/rabbit; to see a duck as a rabbit is mistake; and to see a rabbit as a rabbit is right.
Secondly: you have criticized the doctrine that the language of religious texts and the language religion are metaphorical and mythical in the beginning of this book, and have said that the language of religion is a clear and explicit one. The language of this transformation is that of God, a language by which religious truths such as “God exists” have been expressed. Then, how may different and even conflicting understandings of, and various views to, this truth, b formed? Is not this a paradox?
Thirdly: is it possible to issue a philosophical statement through appeal to analogies and metaphors? Philosophical claims should be relied and based upon arguments; analogies and metaphors work good in sermons for ordinary people; within the realm of philosophy and for the learned one, they cannot be confided; epistemic value of analogy is less than the mere experience- i.e. induction.
Fourthly: one should speak clearly: are those who think that vagrancy of the Children Israel in the Sinai desert is punishment of their malfeasance right or not? Is Jeremiah’s understanding of Chaldean threat right or not? Did he make dreams and tales, or did he discover reality? Dear Mr. Hick! Please tell me is Jesus the same as the Messiah and the Christ or a heretical rabbi? Is he a prophet who guides people or a political agitator? Only one of these pictures (and not all of them) is right; for, these three or four pictures can never be brought in agreement.
You say: “Jesus-phenomenon was importantly ambiguous, capable of being experienced in a number of different ways, as the Messiah, as a prophet, as a rabbi, and so on” (ibid., p. 25).
You say: “This word ‘interpret’ can function in two senses or at two levels; and we should now distinguish them.” (Ibid, page 23). Interpretation in the first sense which is a superficial one is either false or a primitive view ranked lower than interpretation in the second sense which enjoys a philosophical depth. Certainly, the two are not equal.
Should one think that Jews are right since they accused Jesus of heresy and agitation? Should he think that their accusative view to Jesus the Christ was some sort of spiritual experience? Should he regard this accusation on a par with prophethood? Should he think that both views are right? Or should he claim that religious teachings are ambiguous, confirm partial accusation made by opponents of the Christ, and be actually unanimous with the ignorant ones and opponents? Such sayings are surprising and not acceptable from you as a philosopher and a faithful Christian.
You say: “On a larger scale we can say that the world, or indeed the universe, is religiously ambiguous – able to be experienced by different people, or indeed by the same person at different times, in both religious and naturalistic ways. This is not of course to say that one way of experiencing it may not be correct, in the – perhaps un-Wittgensteinian – sense of being appropriate to its actual character, and the other incorrect. But, if so, the true character of the universe does not force itself upon us, and we are left with an important element of freedom and responsibility in our response to it … This element of cognitive freedom in relation to God has been stressed by many religious thinkers” (ibid., p. 25).
Who is right: one who interprets the world in a “theist” way or the other who interpret it in an “atheist” way? Can the mere cognitive freedom- which is right- correct all consequence of its application? Is not this a fallacy? Anyway, the world is either theistic or atheistic. Certainly it is not both of them. In conclusion, you have summarized your claims in such a way that nothing but relativism may be understood of it. Please refer again to the conclusion at the end of the Chapter Two of Problems of Religious Pluramism .

Bibliography

Hick, John. The Fifth Dimension: An Exploration of the Spiritual Realm, Oxford: Oneworld, 1999.
Hick, John, An interpretation of religion : human responses to the transcendent, New Haven, CT : Yale University Press, 2005.
Hick, John, Philosophy of religion, Englewood Cliffs, N.J. : Prentice Hall, 1990.
Hick, John, Problems of religious pluralism, New York : St. Martin’s Press, 1985.
Hick, John. “Religious Pluralism”, in companion to Philosophy of Religion, Ed by Philip Quin and Charls Taliaferro. Cornwell: Belackwell, 1999.
John Hick. “Exclusivism verius pluralism in religion: a response to Kevin meeker”, keligious studies, 2006, 42. p 210
Plantinga, Alvin, Warranted Christian belief, New York : Oxford University Press, 2000.
Smith, Wilfred Cantwell. Towards a world theology : faith and the comparative history of religion. Philadelphia, Pa. : Westminster Press, 1981.